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HOW CREATING NARRATIVES STRUCTURES EXPERIENCE AND SELF 
by 
NATALLIA STELMAK SCHABNER 
 
Advisor: Professor Noel Carroll 
This dissertation responds to the challenge to narrativity posed by Galen Strawson in “Against 
Narrativity,” where he claims that not everyone is Narrative by nature and that there is no reason 
to be.  I make my claim “For Narrativity” as a mental process of form finding and coherence 
seeking over time that is an inherent mental activity and essential for experience of one’s Self. I 
make my case through examinations of our experience of time, our use of language, how we 
plan, and our sense of Self. In the first chapter, I show that considering Narrativity as viewing 
life as a story -- focused on the product, rather than the process -- is a category mistake. I put 
forward a revised definition of Narrativity, as a process of Narrativizing, i.e., taking the temporal 
flow of experience and continually shaping and reshaping it towards something like a narrative, 
without necessarily ever achieving a completed form. The second chapter reflects on the value of 
narratives for our understanding and show the importance of Narrativizing: Only through 
Narrativizing are we able to project into the future. The third chapter responds to Strawson's 
proposal of an Episodic, non-Narrative person, taking counter-examples from some of the 
literary works he uses, including Proust and Musil. The fourth chapter explores Narrativity as 
essential to Self and the creation of Self as the organizing principle of experience. I respond to 
Derek Parfit, another opponent of narrativity, who argues that the Self is a falsehood.   The fifth 
chapter draws a connection between how Narrativity functions in response to experience, and 
how a literary narrative triggers our mental process of Narrativity, allowing us to become 


















This dissertation is dedicated to my daughter Sophia Stelmak Schabner, who was born during my 
graduate studies and inspired me throughout the process of this work and gave me a great 
purpose in accomplishing it. 
 
I am extremely grateful to my husband Dean Schabner, who helped me edit this work and shared 
with me his passion and insights on literature, and for being with me through each step of this 
project. 
 
I am enormously grateful to my supervisor Noel Carroll, who helped me with the deep 
realization of the main ideas and the form-finding of this project. I am also grateful to Nickolas 
Pappas for valuable feedback on each draft of this work, to Darren Staloff for his help with the 
section on Historicity, Action and Narrativity. Special gratitude to other members of my 
committee: Lydia Goehr, who inspired me greatly with her teaching in Aesthetics and introduced 
me to Arthur Danto's ideas, and to Jonathan Gilmore, who made reflections on this work. 
 
I am greatly thankful to my life companion Alex Kiefer, who was supportive and encouraging 
during the process of writing and helped me with valuable insights and with references and 
formatting. 
 
And my great gratitude to Galen Strawson, who got me acquainted and inspired me with the idea 













Table of contents 
Introduction            1 
Chapter 1  
Redefining Narrativity          6 
Views of Narrativity           10 
Proponents of the Conventional Narrativity Thesis       14 
CN Narratives vs. Narrativity         18 
Posited Ends            20 
Narrative Thinking           22 
Narrativity and the Self          33 
Temporal Consciousness and Temporal Mental Objects      35 
 
Chapter 2  
Narrativizing           44 
Historicity, Action and Narrativity         45 
‘Trivial’ Narrativity and the Slippery Slope        62 
 
Chapter 3 
Replies to Challenges            64 
Experience of time: Being in the “Now” and the Possibility of Episodic Experience  64 
Proust, Time Regained and Madeleine Moments as Candidates for Episodicity      67 






Narrativity and Self           75 
What Survival Means          77 
Teletransportation and Self          85 
Why Self Matters           88 
 
Chapter 5 
Narrativity and Emotions in Literature        93 
Emotion as a process. Affective appraisal        98 
Emotions in Literature and Resolving the Paradox of Fiction     101 
 
Conclusion            121 






     Narrativity is a nontrivial issue in philosophy because ultimately all we have are our 
experiences, which occur over time, so the challenge is how to make sense of them.  That is, to 
determine whether there is a relationship between our experiences, and if so, what that 
relationship is, and to determine what meaning can be attached to those experiences.  The 
concept of narrativity has been proposed, in various forms, as one answer to this 
challenge.  Broadly speaking, narrativity is the notion that we see or experience our lives as a 
story, or at least in a narrative fashion.   
These views typically involve an emphasis on the product, claiming that we take a 
classical narrative arc as a model for our life as we try to order our experiences. However, our 
life arguably isn’t static, it doesn’t resemble a motion towards some end in Aristotelian terms, 
but could be seen as a matter of activity as such for its own sake, a process that is fluid, 
undergoing continual transformation, inextricable from time.  Because of this, I will argue, the 
storytelling involved in Narrativity as a way to represent life and its experience acquires a 
dynamic nature.  As such, the focus of my discussion of Narrativity will be on the mental 
process involved, not on the product.  I will argue that the definition of Narrativity should be 
reconsidered, that the concept of Narrativity should be seen as a process of form finding and 
coherence seeking over time that constitutes the Self. 
This work responds in particular to the challenge to narrativity posed by Galen Strawson 
in his essay “Against Narrativity” (Strawson 2004) where he claims that not everyone is 
Narrative by nature and that there is no reason to be.  I focus on his argument against the 




that we should or shouldn’t be narrative, but states that this is simply the way we are.  I will 
make my case variously through examinations of our experience of time, our use of language, 
how we make plans and projects, and through our sense of Self.  I will also examine the notion 
of an Episodic person, as put forth by Strawson and exemplified in literature, to see whether such 
a state of being is in fact non-Narrative, as he says.  
To begin with, in the first chapter, I look into the accounts of some proponents of 
narrativity such as Noel Carroll, Louis Mink, Paul Ricoeur and Gregory Curry and show how 
Narrativizing (proposing a possible narrative) is an intrinsic aspect of consciousness.  I will 
expound a more active model of Narrativity, focusing on the process rather than the narrative 
product.  In this way, I will attempt to overcome the failure of many proponents of narrativity to 
take into account the fact that the model of realist fiction, generally presented as the form our life 
narratives take, is not a universally accepted narrative model.  While the form and content of 
narratives are culturally specific, the impulse to Narrativize and to use narrative as a tool of 
understanding is a part of being human.  
To explore how Narrativity functions, I will then look at temporal consciousness and 
temporal mental objects we could hold in our mind, drawing a parallel with the Kantian notion of 
apperception that is a basis for the form-finding in Narrativity.  The scope of this concept will 
shift to the phenomenological domain and be looked at as a manifold of content unfolding over 
time.  Such a manifold of content doesn’t have definite boundaries in its form, but is open in 
terms of where it begins and where it ends.  It lacks closure, since the center of gravity shifts as 





I will examine Husserl’s contention (Husserl 1964) that the unfolding of the manifold of 
our mental content is inseparable from imagination, that it is our imagination or phantasy that is 
able to combine our impressions into a unity.  Considering Husserl’s discussion of our grasp of 
melody, I will draw a parallel to the kind of non-conceptual causality heard in music -- that some 
progressions “feel” right, that melodic lines and harmonic structures create certain expectations 
of how they will be resolved -- with the process of Narrativity, to demonstrate how deep-seated 
and intrinsic it is to our mental activity. 
Roman Ingarden (Ingarden 1973) picks up this theme, seeing the manifold of our mental 
content taking the form of a mental/imaginary object that could exist in an aesthetic realm like a 
work of music or a literary work.  Ingarden goes further however, positing that for such a mental 
object to be formed from the manifold, there must be a Self that assembles it and holds it 
together. 
In the second chapter I will reflect on the value of narratives for our understanding and 
show the importance of Narrativizing, and why it is that this is a mental activity that is common 
to all of us. I will look at Aristotle’s discussion of two forms of narrative -- poetry and 
history.  For him, poetry is more significant than history because it reaches for possibility in a 
timeless manner and so we could understand Universals.  Universals could be understood in 
poetry through the mental narrative engagement with particulars that are embodiments of those 
Universals.  The power of imagination engaged by poetry elevates us to the Platonic realm of 
forms. 
For the poet, of course, form finding is not only temporal.  Metaphor, a tool of the poet, 
is also a kind of form finding.  The next section of the chapter discusses metaphor. To become a 




ability of pattern recognition is the ability of form finding and coherence seeking, even in finding 
identity in difference.  In its highest aesthetic power, such an ability is looking for identity in 
difference and cannot be limited to causal connections alone, but also has its origin in non-causal 
and non-conceptual connections.  This synthetic capacity of time puts in motion our mental life 
as well as influences our actions.  Just thinking of our past and future selves we engage in 
metaphor making, as Ted Cohen (Cohen 2009) says. 
Correlating historicity, action and narrativity and following Danto’s argument on 
narrative sentences (Danto 1962), I’ll show that only through the act of Narrativizing are we able 
to project into the future, planning actions.  For Danto, we cannot use project verbs without 
making claims on the future; similar points are made by Paul Ricoeur (Ricoeur 1984) and 
Husserl (Husserl 1964).  Building on these arguments, I will show that we are intrinsically 
Narrative, since in virtue of using language we place ourselves in a temporal 
context.  Embarking on any project is impossible without Narrativity. 
Drawing on these discussions, I will examine Strawson’s acceptance of Narrativity in 
certain senses that he calls trivial, such as in mundane actions like making coffee and other 
projects that require planning.  I will argue that such a triviality claim falls into a slippery slope 
argument.   The implications of accepting the Narrativity involved in such an act as making 
coffee aren't trivial and the triviality as such could be a matter of degree, not of kind. 
In the third chapter, I will respond to Strawson's proposal of a person as Episodic and 
non-Narrative (Strawson 2004), taking examples from some of the same literary works that he 
uses as a basis for his claim.  I will explore Proust’s understanding of involuntary memory, 
taking account of the paradox he proposes regarding the extra-temporal state in which we find 




"man without qualities" as a candidate for an Episodic and show how the character attempts to 
break from Narrativity and intends to return to it.  
The fourth chapter explores Narrativity as essential to Self and the creation of Self.  The 
Self is viewed as the subject of experience, the organizing principle through which experience is 
processed.  Here I will respond to Derek Parfit (Parfit 1987), another opponent of Narrativity, 
who argues that the Self is a falsehood and makes a prescriptive claim that we shouldn't be 
attached to any strong connection between our Selves through time, supporting his view with 
thought experiments involving fission, division and teletransportation.  Looking at the advances 
of neuroscience and explorations of psychology, I will address his challenges. 
In my last chapter I draw a connection between how Narrativity functions in response to 
experience, and how a literary narrative as a product triggers our mental process of Narrativity, 
allowing us to become engaged with the work.  In this way I carry my argument over into the 
aesthetic domain.  In particular, I look at how stories engage our emotions, since emotion plays 
such a significant role in our conception of Self.  I narrow this scope looking at how emotions 
are triggered in literature and show how Narrativity is necessary for such an experience and how 














In his story “The Other” (Borges 1999, 411), Jorge Luis Borges creates a thought 
experiment that addresses one of the most perplexing and currently contentious philosophical 
issues: What is the relationship between our Self at one time in our lives and our Self at 
another?  Borges imagines the meeting of one person-slice with another from the same person, 
and tries to see what effect such a meeting would have.  How, first could it be established that 
the two were time-slices from the same person, and then how would each react?  In this thought 
experiment, a 20-year-old Borges and one in his 70s confront one another and must resolve their 
differences.  The existence of the “other” Borges challenges the concept of identity for each of 
the two -- though perhaps more strongly for the younger one, who must face the apparent 
evidence that he will not become the person he imagines he will.  The older one only must deal 
with the fact that as a younger man he did not hold the beliefs he now holds and that he does not 
remember everything he did and knew half a century earlier.  The problem for each is how to fit 
the “Other” who is also himself into the story he tells about himself. 
If it were Galen Strawson writing the story, it seems, it would be a completely different 
matter.  First, because, as Strawson describes himself in “Against Narrativity” (Strawson 2004) 
and other works, he is a person who feels no connection between the Self he is now and the Self 
he was in the further past or the self he might become in the further future -- though he does 
admit that he is the same human being, in the sense of the same physical entity.  And secondly, 




Borges’ tale plays on the conflict between the common, perhaps unexamined assumption 
that there is a persistent self, and the apparent evidence that who we are changes so dramatically 
that were such a meeting as he describes really possible, it would challenge all of our beliefs 
about who we are.  How could we possibly say that the young Borges and the old Borges are the 
same Self if they feel such shock and -- at least in the case of the young Borges -- revulsion at 
seeing the other?  For Strawson, the response would be that the two Borgeses may be the same 
human being, separated by 50 years, but different selves, because throughout the life of a human 
being, there are many distinct selves.  So there is really no reason for the discomfort that the 
young and old Borges both feel at the meeting.  While I accept part of Strawson’s argument -- 
that he and many others may feel little or no connection between the self they are currently with 
the selves they have been in the past, or to the selves they may become in the future, because 
they are what he calls Episodic -- I will claim that there is in fact good reason for the two 
Borgeses’ discomfort, and that it is a result of the Narrativity that is the core of how people, even 
Strawson (whether it is part of his story or not) experience their lives. 
The issue of narrativity is a non-trivial question in philosophy because all we have are 
our experiences, so the challenge is how to make sense of those experiences.  Narrativity is 
commonly defined as the tendency to view one’s life as a story, to make narrative connections 
between events at different times in one’s life.  Proponents of narrativity range from those who 
say that we attempt to see our lives as well-formed narratives, like traditional realist novels, to 
those who argue only that we attempt to fit the events of our lives into a narrative framework, 
without necessarily creating a completed structure.  There is also a division between those who 




as the prescriptive thesis -- and those who argue more broadly that this is something everyone 
does, the descriptive thesis. 
What is common to all these arguments is the focus on the product -- the narrative.  I will 
argue for Narrativity as a mental process, as form-finding over time, which is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for experience of one’s Self.  In addressing form-finding as non-trivial for 
Narrativity I will make a claim that Narrativity requires only “form-finding over time,” a 
dynamic process of constant change and new beginning.  Other kinds of form-finding, such as 
spatial or mathematical, could not be considered Narrativity, because they are non-temporal.  I 
will also make a clear differentiation between Narrativity, as process, and narrative, as 
product.  Narrativity needs only to point towards closure and consequently can constantly be 
narrativizing as a result of experience without ever producing a finished narrative with the shape 
-- whether it be beginning, middle, end, or conflict, climax, resolution -- that we associate with 
traditional novels or stories.  
I begin my discussion with Strawson because, though he denies that all people are 
naturally narrative, in “Against Narrativity” (Strawson 2004), he presents an account that is 
nuanced, avoiding the normative claims of Derek Parfit, for example, who argues in Reasons and 
Persons  (Parfit 1984) that we should not be attached to our past or future selves.  Strawson’s is 
not an all-or-nothing answer to the question.  He claims that there are two basic types of people: 
Diachronics and Episodics, who naturally experience life in different ways.  Strawson maintains 
that if one is Diachronic, “one naturally figures oneself, considered as a self, as something that 
was there in the (further) past and will be there in the (further) future” (Strawson 2004, 
65).  While if one is Episodic, “one does not figure oneself, considered as self, as something that 




Episodic is not an amnesiac: She has memories and knows that things happened to her, that she 
did various things throughout her life, but she does not feel strongly connected to those 
things.  In addition to these two types, there are, he says, people who are narrative and non-
narrative, and he suggests that there may be Episodics who are either one, though it seems less 
likely that there could be non-narrative Diachronics.  
Further, Strawson’s framing of the debate over narrativity is useful.  I will accept as a 
starting point his spelling out of what he calls the psychological and the ethical theses regarding 
narrativity.  The Ethical or normative narrativity thesis claims that “experiencing or conceiving 
one’s life as a narrative is a good thing; a richly Narrative outlook is essential to a well-lived life, 
to true or full personhood” (Strawson 2004, 63).  This is a normative account, saying that while 
narrativity may not be true of every one, it should be because it is the only way to have a full 
emotional and/or moral life.  The psychological narrativity thesis as defined by Strawson is “that 
human beings typically see or live or experience their lives as a narrative or story of some sort, 
or at least as a collection of stories” (Strawson 2004, 63).  This, as he says, is a purely 
descriptive account: It does not carry a claim that we should be this way, just that we are.  
He then differentiates four possible combinations of views of the ethical and 
psychological theses.  The common view, he says, assumes that both of those theses hold true for 
human nature.  One might accept the psychological thesis and reject the ethical one, like Sartre in 
La nausee or the Stoics.  One might deny the psychological thesis and affirm the normative one, 
claiming that though we aren’t naturally narrative in our thinking, we should be in order to live a 
good life.  Such a view, he says, is “in Plutarch and a host of present-day writing.” 
As for Strawson himself, he holds the view that neither of them is true.  In his view, both 




Narrative people and there are good ways to live that are deeply non-Narrative.”  His argument 
is not that there aren’t Narrative people, or that there shouldn’t be, but that not everyone is 
Narrative and there is no reason to be. 
 
Views of Narrativity 
After a brief overview of some of the main arguments from contemporary proponents and 
opponents of narrativity, I will propose my own answer to the question of whether narrativity is 
an intrinsic mental property -- whether we all Narrativize as the primary mode of making sense 
of experience and as the way we create the Self. 
Considering the self as the creation of narrativizing, of course, faces some objections, 
first from those who equate it with, as Peter Goldie says, having “a tendency to fictionalize our 
lives, to give our lives a kind of narrative structure that is appropriate to traditional fiction but 
that is simply not appropriate to real life” (Goldie 2012, 161).  I am not quite convinced that it is 
“not appropriate” to see “real life” through a structure that allows the emotional, ethical and 
intellectual complexities found in such works of “traditional fiction” as The Red and the Black or 
Crime and Punishment, but perhaps those are not the kinds of novels Goldie has in mind.  On the 
other hand, accepting his premise, the simple response is that the misuse or abuse of something -- 
in this case, through Narrativity trying to give our lives a narrative structure like that in a novel -- 
is not necessarily an argument against the proper use of a thing: It is merely a caution to use it 
correctly.  Just because some people speed or drive drunk, it does not follow that no people 
should drive cars. 
Perhaps the deeper point here is the concern that by narrativizing, we might create a 




say that it is in fact appropriate for us to wonder, as Dickens’ David Copperfield does, “whether 
I shall turn out to be the hero of my own life,” because this thought from traditional fiction 
encourages self-examination.  The answer to this question, however, could be yes or no without 
undermining Narrativity.  But still, the question remains whether there is a truth about the Self 
that might be missed as a result of narrativizing.  
Peter Lamarque (Lamarque 2007) frames his argument for the potential dangers of 
narrativity by focusing on the problems inherent in confusing the narratives we see in fiction 
with those we create when we talk about ourselves.  These arise, he says, from the fact that 
fictional characters, however “real” they might seem, do the things they do for aesthetic 
reasons.  That is, their actions are not like the actions of living people because they are 
essentially plot devices, dreamed up by an author to make their story work.  The problem 
becomes that by attempting to see our lives as well formed narratives -- essentially imagining 
that we are living in a traditional realist novel -- we would fail to reassess and adjust our views as 
situations change.  This is only an issue if the focus is on the product of Narrativity -- what our 
narrative should look like -- rather than on the mental process of narrativizing, of continually 
shaping and reshaping our experience. 
Many of those who argue for narrativity, make the case for what Strawson would call the 
ethical thesis.  For example, Marya Schechtman in “Stories, Lives, and Basic Survival: A 
Refinement and Defense of the Narrative View” (Schechtman 2007) (which was written, she 
admits, after considering Strawson’s attack on narrativity), accepts Strawson’s distinction 
between Selves and Persons and his notion of Episodics, but still claims that the way to an 
emotionally rich and moral life is to think about our lives in narrative terms.  However, she says 




represent a quest or have a well defined plot that fits a distinct literary genera” (Schechtman 
2007, 163).  By this distinction, she avoids the concerns raised by Goldie and Lamarque about 
confusing life and literature. “An identity constituting narrative” is a narrative form that does not 
face the same aesthetic expectations faced by a literary narrative. 
I like the sentiment of this, but I see the need to go further, because I am less interested in 
the content or form of any narrative a person might hold about their lives than I am in the process 
by which that narrative is constructed; hence, I am arguing for Narrativity (process), not 
narrative (form and content).  While most of the literature tends to focus on the narrative that is a 
product of Narrativity and requires closure, my view is of the primary importance of the process 
itself, which, though involving narrative thinking and making narrative connections, needs only 
raise the possibility of closure, without necessarily reaching it.  Simply put, thought is 
inextricable from time, thought always involves time, exists in time, because the present is 
always emerging from the past and always moving toward the future.  While a “time slice” may 
be a common term in the philosophical debate, it is a nonentity.  The parameters for such a 
“slice” cannot be set because of the continual movement of time.  There is, practically speaking, 
no such thing.  Even for a person who, like Strawson, might claim that all we have is “this 
moment,” the “here and now,” that “here and now” does not exist outside of time.  It is not static 
-- by the time it is experienced -- by the time the sense data is processed, it is already the 
past.  Strawson’s argument that because all we have is the “here and now” we do not need to 
Narrativize fails because the “here and now” is constantly moving, and can only be understood 
in the context of that movement of time. 
I will argue for the descriptive, psychological thesis, not the ethical normative thesis, to 




or a bad thing.  I will show that even denying Narrativity is in itself a form of narrative -- it is the 
story that there is no story.   Rather than coming from the ethical standpoint as most proponents 
do, I will come from an aesthetic standpoint, that Narrativity is the way that we create our Self.  I 
will show that Narrativity is the way we experience our lives. 
Narrativity, of course, is not the only mode of thought.  The mathematical mode, 
obviously, would not involve Narrativity, being pure abstraction.  Even in the case of a series of 
computations, we are not dealing with Narrativity because the results are in a sense 
predetermined by the laws of mathematics.  There is no need to look for causes and there is no 
other way for the computation to turn out.  The scientific mode of thought, too, even though it 
often deals with processes, could not be called Narrativity, as it attempts to ascertain universal 
rules or principles.  
In the next section, I argue against conventional views of narrativity.  Despite my 
argument that Narrativity need not result in a finished, fully shaped narrative product, I will take 
literary examples to demonstrate the various forms that Narrativity as a process can take, and as 
examples of different possible qualitative experiences of one’s Self.  Those experiences will 
differ in the temporal and aesthetic form they take, such as short stories vs. novels, but also 
stylistically and in how consciousness is presented by an author.  I will use literature not to assert 
that people do or should think of themselves as characters in a novel or story, but to show how 
varied the narrative process can be.  I will also use literary examples to illustrate the forms the 
narratives of our experiences might take to suggest it as another philosophical tool, which 
philosophers use too rarely and which is not less powerful than thought experiments.  Further, 
literature is valuable to this discussion because in the case of many authors, for example Proust 




self, and while they may not be doing it in a philosophical manner, they are examining the 
experience of what-it-is-to-be like a self.  Musil’s Man Without Qualities (Musil 1996), is 
particularly relevant because while this is a novel Strawson and other critics of narrativity seem 
to favor as one that makes their case, I will use it to show the varieties of narrative 
possibility.  Proust’s work has also been brought into the discussion by Strawson, so it also needs 
to be discussed. 
 
Proponents of the Conventional Narrativity Thesis  
I am not just arguing against opponents of narrativity, but to some extent against many of 
those who argue for what I would call the conventional narrativity thesis (CN).  This thesis, 
supported by Marya Schechtman, Gregory Currie (Currie 2010), Louis Mink (Mink 1987), Paul 
Ricoeur (Ricoeur 1984) and others, contains the idea that people do or at least should view their 
lives as a narrative, the model being traditional realist fiction.  My objection to this view is at 
least two-fold.  On the one hand, the CN argument is centered on the product -- the narrative -- 
rather than the mental process by which a narrative might be created.  But I would also argue that 
the model chosen for that product -- traditional realist fiction -- is far too limiting.  First of all, it 
oversimplifies a rich and extremely varied period of Western literature, but it also essentially 
excludes the peoples of those cultures that do not have a tradition of literary realism.  As mine is 
a descriptive argument, I do not place a higher value on seeking psychological coherence over 
any other kind.  
Traditional realist fiction, a form that flowered in the 19th century and to some extent 




what has a beginning and middle and end." (Aristotle, Poetics, 1450b27).  This three-part view 
of a plot structure (with a beginning, middle and end -- technically, the protasis, epitasis and 
catastrophe) is essential to realist fiction. 
But if for Aristotle, poetry (which of course for him meant the narrative art) imitates life, 
it seems that proponents of CN say life should imitate poetry.  We should see our lives as fitting 
neatly into the structure of a beginning, middle and end.  We should create a narrative that has 
the kind of plot arc seen in the great novels of Victorian England, seeing ourselves as David 
Copperfields or Dorothea Brookes.  By this account, the emphasis is placed on the character 
created.  It is prescriptive not of process, but of content and of the form of that 
content.  Questions can be raised about CN from a literary perspective -- the 20th century has 
seen the modernist, post-modernist and other literary movements that reject traditional realism as 
a valid form for making sense of life as adherents of those movements saw it -- but there is 
another fundamental problem with the CN view.  
If, as Schechtman and others say, I should see and live my life as though it were a 
narrative, then, by definition of a narrative, I must be projecting towards an ending, a 
conclusion.  But a novelist can wrap up the threads of her tale wherever she sees fit, and at the 
last word, there is the end.  In life, however, there are no conclusive endings besides death.  Does 
that mean that we all should be attempting to see our lives in an arc that somehow will resolve all 
the conflicts and tie up the loose threads at our death?  If that is the case, then we have to deal 
with the great unknown of how and when we will die, an issue that obviously complicates the 
construction of a well-formed narrative to the point of impossibility.  This is a point I will return 




One obvious objection is that literature -- even the traditional realist novel -- 
accommodates the fact that there are no real endings in life -- other than death.  The traditional 
structure of the narrative has been challenged, not only before and after the period of realist 
fiction, but even by writers seen as the greatest examples of that form.  
Any survey of literature, even of only the last 300 years of Western literature, would 
provide ample evidence of the great variety of forms -- or seeming formlessness -- that narratives 
may take and still be narratives, and of the ambiguities surrounding characters within those 
narratives.   
Tristram Shandy is certainly a narrative, but one that constantly spins away from 
expectations, picking up new threads and dropping them, and going off on tangents.  Even in 
novels or stories that follow a more traditional form, endings do not necessarily bring total 
closure -- that is, closure that does not push towards a new beginning.  Chekhov’s tightly 
constructed miniatures might close, but they do so in resolutions of ambiguity, that force the 
reader to go beyond what has been narrated -- both in terms of what has been said and in terms of 
the temporal frame, so that the narrative itself pushes to alternative narratives.  Dostoevsky’s 
Crime and Punishment ends with the statement that the apparent resolution is really only the 
opening of a new narrative yet to be told.  Even the classic fairy-tale ending, “and they all lived 
happily ever after...” begins a new story, even if it is one that appears as if it would be too boring 
to be told. 
Strawson himself says he recognizes an affinity between himself and a character in a 
novel -- Musil’s Man Without Qualities, which is yet another example of a narrative that does 
not ever come to closure, yet is considered one of the handful of greatest novels of the 20th 




would wrap up all the threads of his massive work.  The novels of Robbe-Grillet and Michel 
Butor, the French nouveau roman, with their cold, present-tense accounts, provide examples of 
how narratives can be completely set in the present moment, in the instant by instant movement 
of perception, the “Now” that Strawson says he lives in, and still be narratives -- perhaps 
providing examples of what the narrative of one of Strawson’s episodics might be like.  Again, if 
works of literature that are considered narratives can be so varied, it may not be so clear that we 
do not all think of our lives as some form of narrative. 
All the various forms that literary narratives take may be attempts on the authors’ parts to 
match life, to convey their own experience of it, or possible experiences of it that they see.   This 
variety demonstrates again the dynamic nature of storytelling as a form of discourse. 
To turn again to Dostoevsky, we see in all of his greatest works an ambiguity of events 
and character; there is a sense that other things could have happened, and that what seems to 
have happened isn’t what actually happened, which often remains fundamentally 
unknowable.  This is just the difficulty we face as we Narrativize, that we are limited to our own 
perceptions and must attempt to make sense of them, even when they are unclear or conflict with 
our expectations. 
To take just one passage from Dostoevsky’s Demons (which I will analyze in greater 
detail below), there is a scene in which (Dostoevsky 1976a, 260-1): 
I saw how they ran into each other in the doorway: It seemed to me that they both 
stopped for an instant and somehow strangely looked at one another.  But I couldn’t see 
very well in the crowd.  Some people swore, on the contrary, and absolutely seriously, 
that Liza, looking at Nikolai Vsevolodovich, quickly lifted her hand, just level with his 
face, and probably would have hit him if he hadn’t been able to move away.  ... I admit, I 
myself didn’t see anything, but on the other hand, everybody swore that they saw it, 
although they couldn’t have because of the bustle... Only I didn’t believe it then.  I 
remember, however, that the whole way back Nikolai Vsevolodovich was a little pale.   




The fragment doesn’t fit neatly into the CN structure, because what we are presented with is not 
a settled narrative, but a process of narrativizing that we see in the narrator and that we are 
forced to engage in as well.  We do not know what exactly happened and, like the narrator, 
entertain different possibilities that could result in hypothetical narratives and posited endings, 
none of which is definite.  Throughout Dostoevsky’s work we are confronted with different 
possible versions of events, forced to make our own judgments about which are reliable and to 
create our own vision of the characters and their actions.  Thus instead of being constrained by a 
narrative, we are narrativizing.  Instead of trying to fit content in established form, we are 
engaged in the process of mental form-finding for that content.  Dostoevsky may be an extreme 
case, but I would argue that we must engage in a similar process when confronted by any 
narrative, no matter how didactic or how much it pretends to certainty about the events and 
characters described. 
What we are confronted with in Dostoevsky’s narrative is analogous to what we face in 
dealing with our experiences.  Our sense perceptions are fleeting and we are forced to make 
judgments based on incomplete information about people and events.  We must constantly create 
possible narratives, and yet be ready to modify the story, not clinging to earlier versions as new 
situations arise.  Thus the narrative cannot be completed, but is in a constant process of revision. 
 
CN Narratives vs. Narrativity 
This points to the fundamental problem with CN accounts: People do not act in life as 
characters in novels, at least, not as a reader sees those characters in the finished product.  The 




but is continually being modified in an extended process in time.  Narrative is a product that is 
posited outside of the subjective experience of time, while life is a process of existing in time and 
having a form-finding or coherence-seeking tendency.  Therefore I claim that arguing that we do 
or should view ourselves as a character in a narrative is a category mistake. 
Narrativity does not mean seeing oneself as living in a narrative, with a beginning, 
middle and end, but rather engaging in narrativizing, which can be defined as the mental 
activity of form finding or coherence seeking over time.  So the analogy to literature is not to the 
reader/text relationship, but to the author in the act of creation, and more specifically to authors 
such as Stendhal and Dostoevsky (to name two in the realist tradition) whose process involves a 
high degree of improvisation, not working from a firmly developed outline.  Narrativizing is an 
ongoing process by which potential endings may be posited or entertained, but need not ever be 
formalized.  Narrativizing does not demand an ending, because it is an ongoing process of 
creation. 
CN takes the variables of time and experience out of the equation in the discourse on life 
and narrative.  The tendency is to start with a narrative and see how it applies to an agent’s life. 
But "the narrative posit" is not sufficient to capture the temporality of our experience.  With 
Narrativity the correlation is not to a character, even the main character in a narrative, but to the 
author of that narrative, and not the author with a finished book, but in the process of creating. 
An analogy can be made with Aristotle’s concepts of motion and activity.  By his 
account, motion is directed towards some End, in the way that somebody works on building a 
house and when it is built, the End is accomplished. One reaches the End by having it 
built.  Activity, on the other hand, is pursued for its own sake. It is not aimed at any final 




were.  Being a good friend is an identity one takes over on one's self. One's End here is dwelling 
in the activity of friendship as such. 
In the Aristotelean sense of the terms, Narrativity is activity, a dynamic concept of an 
End that is extended in time, a process, not a Motion towards a rigid definite End, such as that 
suggested by the structure of a narrative, particularly the traditional realist narrative championed 
by CN.  Narratives are effects of such activity that could be posited, but aren’t constituents of life 
experience as such. 
 
Posited Ends 
Could we experience an Ending or a Beginning as such or are those constructs that we 
need to posit for psychological comfort?  
There are no set, concrete beginnings and ends in life (with the exception of birth and 
death), since we cannot really have an experience of the end and an experience of the 
beginning.  Our memories begin at some point, but as we age, some fade, some disappear, others 
return, suddenly vivid.  Connections, sequence, context all become clouded, or need to be 
reconstructed, posited.  Even with relatively simple projects, it may not be possible to determine 
a single definite point at which the process began.  When did I first think about planting roses?  It 
seems arbitrary to say the process began when I bought the seedlings.  And is the end when I 
have gotten them all in the ground, or does it continue, day after day, as I water them, watch 
them grow, prune them, etc.? The end and the beginning could only be entertained, tentatively 




There are many events in life that assume a simultaneous ending of one thing and 
beginning of another.  A graduation, for example, assumes the end of student life and beginning 
of a professional one.  We have a need for deadlines, so we could, despite our natural inclination 
to procrastinate, accomplish our projects and anticipate the new exciting beginning that such an 
accomplishment brings.  After all major milestones in life it seems natural to ask the question: 
"And now what?"  Indeed, even looking ahead to that final milestone, death, we ask, “And then 
what?” 
Each of us recognizes ourself as mortal, as a being that is going to die. This is a certainty, 
but also indefinite, constantly possible.  We are certain that it is going to happen, but we do not 
know when.  
Facing the possibility of death, we choose all other possibilities in recognition that we are 
going to die. We choose any possibility in light of that essential possibility.  Could we project 
towards our own death?  Such projection is necessarily uncertain, because even though it is 
projection towards what certainly is going to happen, we can project towards it only in light of its 
possibility.  
If a narrative is supposed to follow traditional realist modes, it should direct toward a 
definitive ending.  Since the only such definitive ending in life is death, CN would seem to be 
implying that our narrative should be projecting towards that moment.  By narrativizing, rather 
than seeing our lives as a well formed narrative as CN proposes, we entertain posited endings 
that need not ever be reached. The narrative is not what is essential; Narrativity is.  Narrativity, 
as a mental power, is an attempt to take control of time and experience. 
I have shown that many of the objections to Narrativity arise from the emphasis on the 




attempting to fit experience into an established form, we continually re-evaluate and reshape that 
form in light of new perceptions and experiences.   
 
Narrative Thinking   
I will now turn to look at the particular value of narratives as a tool for understanding, in 
order to help explain why narrativizing is fundamental to making sense of experience.   Apart 
from answering objections, I also show that the conception of Narrativity as process is essential 
for understanding literature and narrative (product). 
Across all cultures and apparently throughout time -- or at least that time in which people 
have had language -- stories have played a central role in human culture.  Whether passed on 
orally or written down, stories play a variety of roles all at once.  They entertain, but also carry 
information and often, in the case of myths and religious stories, moral values and what the 
culture considers knowledge about how the world works and how to live.  This universal impulse 
to storytelling is evidence that Narrativizing is not a culturally conditioned activity -- i.e., while 
the form and content of narratives may be culturally specific, the impulse to create narratives 
appears to be part of being human.  So the question arises of what is the value of narrative 
thinking. 
I will start with an historic account of the notion of Narrative Thinking, which derives 
from narrative theories, to clearly demonstrate how Narrativity is different as a concept.  We 






Here is a definition of terms: 
 Self -- a subject of experience.  
 Narrative -- an account of an event or series of events. 
 Narrative thinking -- considering temporally ordered events relating to a single subject in  
an effort to find (possible) causal connections. 
 
 Narrativity -- a mental process of form finding or coherence seeking over time for a  
 subject of experience/Self. 
        
 Narrativize -- to be engaged in the mental process of form finding or coherence seeking       
over time. 
  
Through examples and historical accounts of narrative thinking I will make such distinctions 
more clear. 
Much of the discussion about narrative is about its value in communication to others, 
how narrative is used to express a temporal series of events and their causal relationship.  In 
regards to the self, the discussion of narrative focuses primarily on the relationship to others, 
how we use narratives in speech acts to describe ourselves.  Though I am more interested in 
Narrativity in terms of how we think about ourselves, some of these discussions of narrative as 
communication to others is relevant to my argument.   
For example, Louis Mink (Mink 1987) claims that historical understanding is a paradigm 
case of the configurational mode of comprehension.  Historical understanding, he says, occurs 
when a person can see a series of events that occurred one after another as constituting a single 
sequence or complex whole with its own definite identity.  The job of a historian, on his account, 
is to be able to make a “synoptic judgment,” in which chronologically separate events are seen to 
make up a complex whole, and then to express this judgment by constructing a narrative that in 




be, for most people, associated with fairy tales, myths, and the entertainments of the novel, it 
remains true that narrative is a primary cognitive instrument -- an instrument rivaled, in fact, 
only by theory and by metaphor as irreducible ways of making the flux of experience 
comprehensible” (Mink 1987, 185). 
I would pick up on the idea of the configurational mode of comprehension and agree that 
narrative is a primary and irreducible form of human comprehension.  We are 
constant “historians of self,” we are narrating and judging our experiences no matter how short 
lived they are.  Relative to this historical understanding, the future could be perceived as an 
untold story or a projected story. 
I should note here that despite the value of narrative as a cognitive instrument, there is an 
inherent indeterminacy of any narrative.  This indeterminacy can be either external or internal, 
but in either case arises from the necessary subjectivity of any narrative. 
In the case of history or biography, the indeterminacy is often external: That is, even the 
most internally consistent narrative of a life or historical event is open to argument, because the 
historian or biographer has necessarily made a choice of how to weigh various elements of her 
story, and has chosen where to assign causal connections between actions or 
events.  Inconsistency can be brought in from outside, with arguments that this or that should 
have been included.  This is why though there are many works of biography and history that are 
considered great, there are none that are considered definitive to the point that they close a topic 
to further discussion or exploration. 
With literature, on the other hand, a narrative’s indeterminacy is usually internal, because 
there is no external, objective reality to which they point.  One obvious example is the work of 




existentialists, who clearly do not share all the views of a professed believer in the Russian 
Orthodox faith.  It is not that his novels are narratively inconsistent, but that they leave room 
within them for readers to find their own way.  Even with a writer as programmatic as Tolstoy, 
we see readers taking Anna Karenina as a tragic heroine, whereas to Tolstoy she must have 
represented so much of what was wrong with contemporary society.  With regard to literary 
narratives, arguments about what a work means do not undermine judgments about the value of 
that work.  Indeed, ambiguity is generally taken as a positive quality of a literary narrative. 
This is only right, because the indeterminacy of narrative is part of what gives it value as 
a cognitive instrument.  Part of what we must do when dealing with any narrative, whether 
considering one we are given or constructing one ourselves, is to dig into it, to examine the 
causal connections proposed.  A mathematical statement is either true or false; with a narrative 
statement it is not a question of either/or, it is a matter of degree.  At best it seems true, and must 
be examined to see how close it comes. 
The reason for the indeterminacy of fictional narratives is that there is no referent outside 
the narrative itself.  Raskolnikov does not exist outside Crime and Punishment, the text, thus the 
referent is self-created.  Thus novels and stories are not properly judged on whether they describe 
reality -- or whether they are ‘true’ to reality -- because they do not describe reality; they create 
their own reality, and thus must be judged internally: What is the aesthetic, what are the rules the 
narrative establishes itself, and does it consistently follow these rules?  That is because a work of 
literature is not a physical object but a mental one.  The question is not whether a work of fiction 
is ‘true to reality,’ but whether it is consistent within itself.  A 21st century reader cannot go to 




David Copperfield or Julien Sorel.  So we judge the novels in which they appear based on 
whether they “seem” real, psychologically and in terms of a possible historical world. 
This indeterminacy might seem to undermine narrative’s value as a cognitive instrument, 
but just the opposite is true.  A narrative is not simply a recitation of a string of facts, it is an 
attempt to create an order out of those facts.  As such, it requires that the person hearing or 
reading it engages with it, interprets it, examines it beyond the facts presented, and even beyond 
the consistency or inconsistency of the connections made between those facts within the 
narrative.  In the case of history or biography, the context of the narrative must be taken into 
account.  Who is the author of the narrative?  What preconceptions, prejudices or political views 
might inform the way the author presents the narrative?  When was it written and what external 
factors might have played a role in the author’s choices. As such, a narrative requires that the 
audience be not a passive receptor of facts but an active cognitive participant in the process of 
understanding. 
In the process of creating a narrative, this potential cognitive value is only intensified, 
assuming of course that there is self reflection or examination of both the process of narrativizing 
and the narrative produced.    
Paul Ricoeur (Ricoeur 1984) claims that we can only make sense of ourselves through 
our involvement with others, and that every narrative we construct involves the intersection of at 
least two human lives.  However, Ricoeur assumes his analysis of self on purely behavioristic 
grounds.  Narrativity, viewed as a cognitive component, doesn’t have to involve other people, 
since the relationship of author and experiencer doesn’t have to be conveyed to anyone else. 




definition.  It is verbal action that requires a second person, whereas Narrativity is a thought 
process, which may or may not result in an expressed narrative. 
More to the point is his argument in Narrative Time (Ricoeur 1984), that our organic 
sense of time, our “within-time-ness” is a direct result of our ability to narrate -- our 
Narrativity.  Here he is speaking not only of memory, but of how we see the future, how we 
project ourselves into the future with hopes, expectations, fears and desires.  In other words, not 
only how we recount ourselves in a narrative, but how we attempt to create ourselves, which I 
see as related to the Nietzschean notion of “becoming.”  
There is another use of the term “narrativity” that is separate from but related to the 
argument I am laying out.  While Strawson, Schechtman and others I have mentioned use 
narrativity to refer to a way of viewing one’s life, the term is also used in discussions of 
narratives themselves, as a property of what makes something a narrative.  In this case, I will use 
the term with a lower case “n”, to distinguish it from Narrativity.  
         Gregory Currie proposes a definition of narrativity by which it is a characteristic of a 
narrative that is a matter of degree rather than of kind.  A notion of a thing being high or low in 
narrativity, Currie claims, addresses better the contextual nature of narrative than a categorical 
account.  Philosophers always want to talk about traditional novels, very linear causal narratives 
with a beginning, middle and closure.  But not all narratives are necessarily like that or what 
Narrativity has to result in.  There are attempts in literature to frustrate the classical notion of 
narrative, to disrupt the generally accepted forms of causality.  Beckett’s Molloy is a good 
example of the traditional rules of a narrative being broken, but Narrativity continuing.  There is 




and definitive information: "The rain is beating on the windows.  It wasn't midnight.  It was not 
raining” (Beckett 1970, 241). 
Currie, however, is still focused on the notion of narrativity as a property of a narrative, 
which is treated as “a product of an act of communication.”  As I have said, my argument is that 
Narrativity is not a property of a narrative at all, but the mental process or activity of an agent 
that works towards the production of a narrative.  For Currie, a narrative must have a unified 
body of representations and must be an intentional-communicative artifact, that is: an object 
whose function is to tell a story.   
Similar to Prince and Currie, Carroll (Carroll 2016) claims that a positive instance of a 
narrative is a matter of degree or narratives are said to possess positive degrees of 
narrativity.  According to Carroll, the degree of narrativity of representation of a sequence of 
events is a function of the number of narrative connections that it possesses. "Different narrative 
genres have different, albeit vague, thresholds of narrativity. Some like a mystery story or a 
thriller probably typically possess higher degrees of narrativity than an encyclopedically 
comprehensive biography of the exceptionally widely documented life of a celebrity," he says. 
What Currie means, however, by the term narrativity is the intensity of the narration 
(corpus or artifact) or, in other words, the input of the agentive narrating situated in time.  This 
input is already a result of self-objectivization or self-production, which is expected to have a 
communicative output.  Playing roles, writing memoirs, etc., are examples of self-
objectivization.  In other words, if you consider expressions of the type: “I think that I ...” the 
first “I,” grammatically speaking, assumes a subject/narrator and the second “I” is an 
object/character, or put another way, the first “I” is in first person, while the second “I” is the 




two.  Therefore there is a distinction between Narrativity and narrative.  Narrativity is a process 
of becoming and form-finding, and the way we create the Self, while a narrative is a product of 
story-telling about who we are.   Narrativity as a term, I suggest, has only a configurational 
aspect of mental form-finding, where the garden and the gardener are one and not separated yet. 
Though what I am talking about is the process, and will not argue that we ever do or should 
create fully realized narratives with a beginning, middle and conclusion as we expect in 
narratives such as novels or biographies, there are parallels between the process of how we 
Narrativize and how such formal narratives work. So to characterize what constitutes Narrativity, 
I find Noel Carroll’s investigation of narrative connection useful.  He lays out five criteria for 
narrative connection (Carroll 2001, 126): 
 (1) the discourse represents at least two events and/or states of affairs (2) in a globally 
forward-looking manner (3) concerning the career of at least one unified subject (4) where 
the temporal relations between the events and/or states of affairs are perspicuously ordered, 
and (5) where the earlier events in the sequence are at least causally necessary conditions 
for the causation of later events and/or states of affairs (or are contributions thereto). 
 
Carroll’s discussion is related to recognizing whether a given discourse is or is not a narrative, 
but because it examines not the form of the discourse, but the internal logic of that discourse, it 
can be applied to the question of what kind of thought can be considered as Narrativity.  This is 
relevant to my debate with people like Strawson, because what Carroll lays out here are just the 
kind of connections that we must make to make sense of events in time.  It is these criteria that 
go into narrative thinking.  Narrativity, however, goes further, because it is not just an ordering 
of events through causal connections, but the creation of a Self. 
Self is the defining principle in Narrativity, which is not included in the terms of NT as 
spelled out by Carroll. That is, it is not just the creation of causal connections between two or 




defines and is in part defined by those actions (or projects).  Narrative thinking as such does not 
require a Self; Narrativity does. 
We are hard-wired to engage in narrative thinking.  We do it all the time by default.  This 
disposition appears to be common not just to humans, who are linguistic, but to all so-called 
higher animals.  Even birds, for example, may engage in narrative thinking when they build nests 
or migrate.  Birds must have some sort of forward reaching project they are involved in.  This 
should not be controversial, since a large group of prominent cognitive scientists, 
neuropharmacologists, neurophysiologists, neuroanatomists, and computational neuroscientists 
stated in the recent Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness that non-human mammals, birds 
and some other animals including the octopus have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical and 
neurophysiological substrates of conscious states and exhibit intentional behavior, which leads to 
the conclusion that they are conscious. 
If we imagine a bird of prey, hovering over a mouse making its way across a field, the 
bird must also have a sense of time to estimate where to direct its dive to catch the moving 
rodent.  The fact that ravens can solve multistep problems is another indication of temporal, 
projectional thinking: If I do this, then this, then this, then I get food.  The simple act of a gull 
taking a clam and flying up high over rocks and dropping it indicates a sense of a forward 
looking project, a disposition to wrap a short-term project in a simple intentional 
anticipation.  Even if an argument is made that a gull could be hardwired to pick up objects and 
drop them, as for example a baby is hardwired to suck, that hardwiring could only be the action 
itself.  Thus, when a gull learns to choose a clam or mussel rather an any clam-sized rock as the 
object to pick up and drop, it may be making narrative connections between the steps of that 




“This is a clam. If I pick it up and drop it, it will break and I’ll have lunch.”  This may be the 
kind of Narrativity Strawson calls trivial, and allows that he may engage in -- such as Narrativity 
surrounding making coffee -- but I bring it up to demonstrate that Narrativizing is possibly not 
merely a human activity, but an intrinsic aspect of consciousness. 
Of course any discussion of non-human animal consciousness is obviously problematic, 
because since we do not have a common language, it must be based on assumptions from 
behavior.  There may be two different but related things that go on that separate Narrativity from 
what the seagull does when it picks up and drops the shell.  The first is the higher order thoughts 
about the Self.  The seagull may see itself as a unique actor, but it seems unlikely that it has 
thoughts about what kind of a seagull it is, the way we think I am or am not that kind of person, 
the kind of person who does this or that.  So self-image is separate from recognizing, as the 
seagull might, just that one is an individual.  That self-image then becomes a basis for fantasy, or 
an aesthetic appreciation or imagining of a life. 
The seagull case, like making coffee, is trivial in the sense that it does not involve -- or 
have to involve -- these higher order thoughts about the Self that is acting.  This issue becomes 
more complicated when we consider one of the key indicators of intelligence in animals -- 
play, because play involves imagination, and at least in some cases, would seem to involve a 
sense of Self.  When you see dogs acting fierce, wrestling, growling, biting one another -- but 
playing, it seems they must be imagining themselves as fierce, when of course they don't really 
mean it.  This would seem to require a sense of Self beyond mere individuality -- knowing that I 
am one kind of Self, but for the game I will be another.  However, I don't think this means that 
we have to grant dogs or other animals that play Narrativity, because for Narrativity, imagining 




animals do not have.  So we come to develop an idea of our own character, which then must be 
reconciled with our actions, and plays into how we project into the future. This becomes 
primarily aesthetic, as opposed to moral, because the act is about harmonizing action with 
character, or, from a narrative sense, making past actions and future projections the proper kinds 
of actions for such a character, and conversely seeing how those actions somehow define that 
character.  This does not require a well-formed narrative, because the driving force is not the 
overall story -- not the construction of a compelling narrative -- but the sense of specific actions 
and how they play into and result from the kind of person -- the character -- we are. 
In virtue of existing in time, we are able to project to each new moment by our mind as 
well as by our senses, and also to assemble our experience of the past.  The concept goes beyond 
simple receptivity and response to environment.   It adds on memory and intentionality, that 
contribute to our ability to Narrativize, that is, to make coherent connections.  If we add time to 
our responses to environment and figure out a rhythm or tendency to mentally adjust to it and the 
disposition of our thoughts to find coherence, we would be able to observe patterns that are 
repetitious in nature, that have a unique form in time.  If we were able to trace the patterns of our 
thoughts musically, we would get aesthetic patterns that would have a signature like in music, 
art, painting, etc., where an authorship could be guessed by the ability to make connections 
alone.   This is like the capacity that Husserl (Husserl 1964) describes to hold a tune from t1 to 
t2, not just the individual notes of the tune, and to be able to recount the whole composition or 
melody.  
But though we are hardwired to Narrativize, Narrativity is also a higher order 
disposition.  It is not experience in itself, but how we think about experience, how we make 




recognize sounds and chords, we can train ourselves to become more sophisticated and subtle in 
our Narrativizing.  Once we learn language and are able to make sense of the world around us in 
sentences, we are able to perfect our linguistic and project based abilities.  This is where 
Narrativity approaches the aesthetic domain. 
The evidence for the hardwired nature of Narrativity can be seen both in child 
development and in human history.  As a means to understand the world, stories predate science 
and mathematics.  Natural phenomena as basic as the sun and the moon or the changes of 
seasons were first explained by stories, whether it is the raven tales common to the Northwest 
Coast American Indians, or the myths of Apollo and of Persephone of the ancient Greeks.  It 
hardly matters whether such tales were ever meant to be taken literally.  They are simply 
examples of the age-old human impulse to come to understanding through narrative thinking, 
and as such are evidence of the inherent nature of Narrativity.  Science has of course proven that 
the sun is not in fact a golden chariot driven by the beautiful god Apollo, yet the tale still has its 
metaphoric appeal and value.  
 
Narrativity and the Self 
How can I claim Narrativity as the way we create the Self, in the face of critics of 
Narrativity theses who say they do not see their lives as narratives, do not feel strong connections 
with their selves either in the extended past or the extended future?  In part, it is because they are 
taking a narrow view of what a narrative is.  We might say that they are stuck in the 19th 
century, in the traditional realist novel view of how a narrative works. They are missing the point 




weakly connected to this current Self, just as the Self that I will become is weakly connected to 
this Self now,” is already to be telling a story, to have a narrative.  That is, a narrative can just as 
easily undermine continuity over time as establish or assert it.  Briefly put, the assertion could be 
that new events and perceptions cause changes in me that are eventually so profound that the 
connections between the “I” now and the “I’s” of previous “nows” become increasingly 
tenuous.  This, too, however, involves Narrativizing because causal connections are being 
posited over time, even if those causal connections explain an apparent discontinuity in the Self.   
The location of the “Self” in the brain has proven elusive to neuroscientists, leading some 
to argue that it is a fiction, an illusion, and should be dispensed with.  Some psychologists, using 
literature as their guide, have also argued that the “Self” is a fairly recent creation and is 
culturally conditioned.  The Narrativity response to both of these potential criticisms is related. 
As discussed above, there is an inherent indeterminacy of narrative, and the truth-giving 
terms for narratives are different than those for mathematics or science.  That is, the truth of a 
narrative is determined internally, not externally with regard to things in themselves.  Narrativity 
has the status of a form/coherence maker where the idea of “coherence” is neutral as to truth or 
falsity, but rather is determined by the property of believability.  This may not seem to 
completely dismiss the criticism that through Narrativizing we can delude ourselves.  Of course 
we can, and often do, but unlike the writer of fiction, when we Narrativize, we do not do so out 
of whole cloth, like the writer of a novel.  The external world constantly impinges on the product 
of the creative imagination, requiring revision, restructuring, perhaps even abandoning a 
proposed version for something wholly new.  So the criticism here is not properly directed at 
Narrativizing per se, but towards clinging to one version -- one narrative -- that has been proven 




undermined by any individual scientist who fails to discard a hypothesis that has been proven 
false. 
 
Temporal Consciousness and Temporal Mental Objects 
Now I will turn to how it is that we can Narrativize, looking at how consciousness 
handles time and in particular what I will call temporal objects -- experiences, exemplified by 
music, that exist primarily as extended in time.   Because I will argue for Narrativity as a mental 
process, I will look first at Kant’s discussion of consciousness (Kant 1965) to examine how we 
perceive and the importance of the Self in our understanding, and at Husserl, who with his 
discussion of our perception of melody (Husserl 1964) makes clear how it is that we are able to 
hold a temporal object in our minds. 
Kant differentiates between two kinds of consciousness: consciousness of one's 
psychological states and consciousness of oneself and one's states via acts of apperception.  "The 
I that I think is distinct from the I that is ... I am given to myself beyond that which is given in 
intuition, and yet know myself, like other phenomena, only as I appear to myself, not as I am" 
(Kant 1965,  B155). This consciousness of one's psychological states could be associated with 
the content of our experience or what our experience is about, while performing acts of 
apperception could be compared with the way we experience life or the act of form-finding. 
Narrativity is a mental power that is essential to the mind.  Kant and his idealist 
successors argue that imagination supplies the content of the “manifold” of our experience, but 
his discussion implies a kind of static reception of information from the senses for that 




case.  “Now” is constantly changing, as time moves, and it cannot be isolated.  Husserl sees this 
distinction and assigns significance to the duration of our experience.  
To explain how, he takes the example of how we come to understand something as a 
melody, rather than as a mere series of individual notes.  A melody is obviously distinct from a 
narrative, since it is nonconceptual and does not involve causal connections (although the 
movement of melodies often proceed from the rules of harmony and thus perhaps could be seen 
as proceeding as a result of nonconceptual causality), but our ability to hold an extended musical 
form in our head, and to see it as an extended form, rather than as merely individual notes 
occurring in succession, is relevant to my argument for Narrativity.  Indeed, one could argue that 
an Episodic would be inclined to break a melody apart -- to see it as just a succession of notes, 
rather than the whole.   
In his discussion, Husserl says (Husserl 1964, 30):  
When, for example, a melody sounds, the individual notes do not completely disappear 
when the stimulus or the action of the nerves excited by them comes to an end.  When the 
new note sounds, the one just preceding it does not disappear without a trace; otherwise, 
we should be incapable of observing the relations between the notes which follow one 
another. We should have a note at every instant and possibly in the interval between the 
sounding of the next an empty (leere) phase, but never the idea (Vorstellung) of a melody. 
 
    As he explains, this is not merely a matter of presentations of the notes simply persisting in 
consciousness.  "If those tones remained unmodified, then instead of Melody we should have a 
disharmonious jumble of sounds.”  So each individual tone is modified by virtue of it existing in 
a temporal frame or object -- the melody.  It is modified by our understanding of its existence 
within that temporal context, not as an isolated sound unrelated to anything else.  The individual 
sounds are taken as parts of a continuum, in a relationship to the notes that precede and follow 




Descartes' famous example of a piece of wax melting, the content of apprehension and the object 
apprehended are in time and in the action of our mind, of our mnemonic capacity.  Otherwise, we 
would not make any connection whatsoever between a solid piece of wax and a melted one.  
The important point here is the role played by imagination, or as Husserl calls it, 
“phantasy,” in taking the temporal manifold of impressions -- in this case a series of notes -- and 
combining them into a unity that exists over time and turns out to be greater than a simple series 
of disconnected sounds.  By coming to understand the notes as a melody, we can feel its 
evocative power, something that would not be there in just the single notes. 
Imagination is engaged both in our perception of the unfolding “now,” and in memory 
for Husserl.  He sees two types of remembrance: the primary one he calls retention, which he 
describes as a comet's tail joined to actual perception.  This is a retention of sensory content in 
the actual perception in the mode of "here and now," similar to how we could perceive a melting 
piece of wax or a train in motion, and this is also how we retain the impression of any static 
perception. 
However, there is also a secondary remembrance, such as that of a melody "which in our 
youth we heard during a concert."  In this example, we do not experience the actual object or 
melody here and now, however the phenomenon of memory has exactly the same constitution as 
the perception.  The only difference is that "we run through a melody in phantasy; we hear ‘as if’ 
first the first note, then the second, etc."  In this case, a "now" point is brought about through a 
continuity of memory.  When we run through a melody in phantasy, we intentionally project the 
mental content in time and recreate a past "now" in an “as if” mode.   
He says, "Thus, phantasy turns out here in a peculiar way to be productive. We have here 




temporal moment.  Thus, in the sphere of phantasy we have uncovered the origin of ideas of time 
(Zeitvorstellungen)" (Husserl 1964, 31). 
Here Husserl goes beyond Kant in his claim that phantasy, i.e. our imagination, is 
essential to our experience of and in time, but while he emphasizes how imagination is 
productive in regard to experience, he seems to fail to see the full creative role it plays.  The 
example of a melody is useful to his discussion, because it is an object that exists not in space, 
but solely in time.  However, it is an object in which the full manifold of content, and the sense 
of the content is given in itself.  Sitting in a concert hall, a listener usually has no difficulty 
determining what belongs to the melody -- the notes produced by the musicians on the stage -- 
and what does not -- the perhaps muffled coughs or rustling of clothes from others in the 
audience.  We know the temporal object -- the melody -- begins when the musicians start to play 
and ends when they finish.  Consequently, the role of the imagination here, while rightly 
described as productive, is somewhat mechanical.  It does not create the melody, but only 
recognizes and reproduces it as an object for understanding.  I take this as an example and 
evidence of our ability to hold an extended temporal object in our minds.  However, for true 
Narrativity -- the process of creating form out of the chaos of perceptions and experience -- this 
mental power can and must be greater, when imagination’s creative power is engaged.  
The manifold of experience is not comparable to a plate of food presented to us by a 
waiter -- an essentially temporally static and spatially defined object -- nor is it as clearly defined 
both in content and across time as a melody.  It is instead a chaotic, complex, constantly shifting 
“now” -- not a series of discrete, distinct, separable “nows.”  Order is not given, but must be 




unfolded, and also look ahead, intentionally creating possible future “nows” that could result 
from our own and others’ responses and reactions to what is in front of us. 
This is what Narrativity, through the creative power of the imagination, does.  It does not 
simply accept the data taken in by the senses, it analyzes that data, assigning values and placing 
that data within the temporal flow of “nows” -- in its creative role it Narrativizes.  The unfolding 
of the manifold of our mental content is inseparable from imagination, or in Husserl’s term, 
phantasy. 
The creative imagination is indeed necessary for Narrativity.  Its function is to take 
material that both current perception and memory provide and simultaneously synthesize it and 
project on it, making claims on the future.  The form of mental content that unfolds by 
imagination on this material is Narrativity. 
Kant recognizes this power of the imagination, but in his discussion he distinguishes 
between the imagination’s empirical use and its creative role, which he limits to daydreams, “to 
entertain ourselves when experience strikes us as overly routine,” (Kant 1987, 49/314) and of 
course to art.  He also allows in passing that the creative imagination may be used to “restructure 
experience,” (Kant 1987, 49/314) but this is mentioned only as a kind of stepping-stone to the 
work of artists who “process that material into something quite different, namely into something 
that surpasses nature.” (Kant 1987, 49/314) 
But the chaos of experience cannot be “restructured” until it is first structured, and that is 
also the role of the creative imagination, because the structure -- a posited structure -- must be 
created.  If we consider the intentional nature of our phenomenal experience,  I claim that it 
unfolds intentionally, reaching forward with time and recreating past experiences, reassessing 




Kant approaches one important aspect of the concept of Narrativity when he mentions the 
idea of acts of apperception as consciousness of one’s psychological states.  However, he is 
puzzled by the issue of how one could appear to one’s self, not meaning an illusion.  What status 
does that illusory manifold of content have if not mere appearance? 
He raises the question in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first critique (Kant 1965, 
B68):  
The whole difficulty is as to how a subject can inwardly intuit itself; and this is a 
difficulty common to every theory.  The consciousness of self (apperception) is the 
simple representation of the ‘I’, and if all that is manifold in the subject were given by the 
activity of the self, the inner intuition would be intellectual. 
In man this consciousness demands inner perception of the manifold which is 
antecedently given in the subject, and the mode in which this manifold is given in the 
mind must, as non-spontaneous, be entitled sensibility.  If the faculty of coming to 
consciousness of oneself is to seek out (to apprehend) that which lies in the mind, it must 
affect the mind, and only in this way can it give rise to an intuition of itself.  
But the form of this intuition, which exists antecedently in the mind, determines, 
in the representation of time, the mode in which the manifold is together in the mind, 
since it then intuits itself not as it would represent itself if immediately self-active, but as 
it is affected by itself, and therefore as it appears to itself, not as it is. 
 
This can be restated: 
P1 In man, consciousness of Self requires inner perception of the manifold. 
P2  This inner perception must affect the mind to give an intuition of it. 
P3 We represent ourselves as affected by ourselves.  
C1 We represent ourselves as we appear, not as we really are. 
 
P4 Time (form) exists antecedently in the mind and determines the mode in which the 
manifold is together in the mind 





Through Narrativity, however, this problem of whether the “I” is an illusion and thus 
false is resolved, because the presentation of the “I,” of self, is clearly not intellectual, it is a 
product of the creative imagination.  It is a mental object, created by imagination from the 
manifold of apperception, and has a status similar to that of Raskolnikov, Hamlet or Anna 
Karenina.  That is, the “I” exists, even though not as a physical object.   
The idea of a mental manifold of content is also present in Hume when he compares mind 
to the bundle of perceptions that makes its appearances in a ceaseless movement. 
...I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or 
collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable 
rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement... The mind is a kind of theatre, where 
several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away, and 
mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.  There is properly no simplicity in 
it at one time, nor identity in different, whatever natural propulsion we may have to 
imagine that simplicity and identity (Hume 1964, 240). 
 
 However there is some tendency in our mind to form the bundle, to direct that perpetual 
theater, even though there might be "no simplicity to it at one time, nor identity in different."  It 
is a disconnected theater that yet holds together, perhaps due its contiguous nature for Hume. 
Husserl introduced the terms "noema" and "noesis"* to designate correlated elements of 
the structure of any intentional act, such as perceiving, judging or remembering. (*from the 
Greek nous, mind).  Noetic content or noesis to which noema corresponds is a mental act-process 
such as judging or remembering. It is directed at noematic correlate content -- the object of the 
mental act.  
Corresponding at all points to the manifold data of the real (realign) noetic content, there 
is a variety of data displayable in really pure (wirklich reiner) intuition, and in correlative 
‘noematic content’, or briefly ‘noema’ -- terms which we shall henceforth be continually 
using (Husserl 1931, 258). 




One remembering a melody would have a noesis of remembering, directed at the 
intentional object -- that is a correlate -- the noema, which is the melody.  So noesis is a process 
of reasoning or cognition for Husserl, while noema is that which is cogitated, the intentional 
object, whether it is a material or an imaginary entity. 
Roman Ingarden affirms that it is not necessary to have a physical object to have the 
manifold of an aesthetic experience, because we could be “pleased by objectivities which are 
completely fictional, conceived by us in our imagination" (Ingarden 1973, 176). Of course he has 
literary works in mind when he makes this point, but in the process of origination by the author 
as well as in the process of cognition by the reader, we have a subjective acquaintance with the 
content that is forming its own tentatively posited mental object of the work in mental 
reality/imagination, which is analogous to Narrativity. 
For Ingarden, this aesthetic experience is not momentary and not "a mere experience of 
pleasure, which stirs in us as a kind of reaction to something given in sense perception," 
(Ingarden 1973, 186) but is comprised of meaningfully connected phases that unfold and take the 
beholder on a journey. The aesthetic object is a vehicle for that journey, but a narrative as a 
mental/imaginary object could come to existence if and only if it is experienced in time by a 
Subject of experience -- a Self.  So even when what is experienced is not physically objectified, 
it is together in the mind as an unfolding and changing manifold of content.  Interestingly 
enough, Ingarden says, "The first reading is particularly important for literary work of art, which 
are perceived in an aesthetic attitude and which make possible the constitution of the aesthetic 
object" (Ingarden 1973, 145).  In the first reading, when she is least familiar with the work, the 




opposed to perhaps seeking a deeper understanding of why things turn out the way they do. In 
this state, a reader is closest to Narrativity. 
Unlike the reading of a novel, however, with Narrativity the mental object is open to 
constant revision, and is in a constant state of being created.  In fact, this creation of the “I” 
could be said to be the most important function of the creative imagination, because of the role 
that “I” plays in ordering all of experience through narrativizing.  It is the focal point around 
which all relationships are ordered.  That “I” -- the Self -- is also what allows us to act rationally. 
This function of the Self increases the stakes on the question of whether there is 
continuity and connection over time.  Strawson’s assertion that he feels little connection between 
the Selves he has been through time, raising the ethical question of whether he feels committed 
to the promises previous selves might have made, or feels responsible for earlier actions.  Taken 
to the extreme, this view would seem to allow a person to act any way they pleased, without 
thinking of the consequences, because whatever they do, in the future they will be able to say, 
“Oh, that wasn’t me.”  But from a practical perspective, a person who does not see continuity 
and connection between Selves, who denies any enduring Self, would seem to have little or no 
basis on which to make any long-term decisions, to decide on any course of action, since the Self 










Chapter 2  
Narrativizing 
 
I turn now to look more deeply at the value of narratives for understanding, to show the 
importance of narrativizing, if we are to make sense of experience.  I will explore the contrast 
Danto (Danto 1962) draws between the Ideal Chronicler, who is non-narrative, and the historian, 
showing that knowing all the facts about a series of events does not lead in itself to 
understanding.  Mink’s argument, cited above, for the value of historical comprehension is 
essential to my project since I see a parallel between, on the one hand, the relation between 
historical narratives (a product) and the activity of a historian, and on the other, how we order 
our mental experiences (a process) based on the material (mental events) memory provides 
us.  We are constant “historians of self,” narrating and judging our experiences no matter how 
short-lived they are. 
Following Danto’s argument regarding narrative sentences further, I will show that only 
through the creative act of narrativizing -- proposing a possible narrative -- are we able to project 
into the future, planning actions and then following through on those plans.  Here I will also look 
at Aristotle’s discussion of history and the narrative art of poetry, both of which he values 
highly.  Aristotle, however, places poetry above history, because of the emotional effect poetry 
has.  This, I will argue, is because poetry involves possibility -- the possibility of other outcomes, 
the same kind of possibility we feel in our experience of our lives. 
I will also reflect on the impossibility of embarking on long term projects without 
Narrativity.  Mental content manifests itself in its form and content in seemingly trivial actions 




project like writing a book or planting roses. The seeming triviality of a mundane action like 
making coffee could be a necessary component in a range of actions that compose a significant 
project.  I’ll show how Strawson’s triviality claim can be used to motivate a slippery slope 
argument. 
 
Historicity, Action and Narrativity 
As an indication of the value of narrative to offer a certain kind of understanding, it is 
interesting that Strawson finds it worthwhile to include in his introduction to Selves (Strawson 
2009) a narrative of how he wrote the book, in which he argues against Narrativity.  He does not 
say why he provides such an account, but it seems to be a tacit admission of the peculiar, unique 
value of narratives regarding temporality and in this case, projects -- a point to which I will 
return below.  Strawson may argue that the subject of the narrative was the human being GS, not 
any of the multiple Selves that existed during the completion of the project.  But it appears that 
even he recognizes that a narrative could be useful in providing an understanding of the 
connection between those Selves, which allowed them -- despite their differences -- to maintain 
enough continuity to engage in a sustained project, even one whose goal is at least in part to deny 
that very continuity.  
Strawson’s rejection of Narrativity is not complete, as we have seen.  First, he accepts 
that some people may be narrative, just not all -- including himself -- and says there is no reason 
to be.  Secondly, he admits that even for himself there may be Narrativity involved in such 
activities as making coffee, but dismisses such cases as trivial.  As I have pointed out above, 
such cases may be trivial, but they indicate how essential Narrativizing is in our lives.  And 




narrativizing become non-trivial?  Applying for a job, for example, would seem to be similar to 
making coffee in that it would involve a series of steps, yet it is obviously a more complex, 
longer term project, and could yield a more important outcome.  Strawson’s own case of writing 
a book also requires Narrativity, as he implicitly recognizes by offering a narrative of the 
process.  I will argue that in fact there is a good reason to be narrative, and more to the point, 
while the Narrativity involved in making coffee might be trivial, the implications of such 
Narrativity are not.  
I will start my argument for the necessity of Narrativity as a mental process now by 
turning to Danto’s example of the Ideal Chronicler vs. the historian (Danto 1962), in which he 
spells out what it is that a narrative account offers beyond a simple -- even if complete -- 
recounting of a series of facts, without the causal connections a narrative provides.  Then I will 
turn to Aristotle’s discussion of history and poetry, showing how the creative aspect of poetry, 
with the force of possibility, makes -- for him -- poetry the higher art.  Through these arguments, 
I will show the necessity of Narrativity. 
The Ideal Chronicler, Danto says, has access to all events and records them as they 
happen, but without the ability to draw any links between them.  History, he says, cannot be 
done by the Ideal Chronicler, even though he is a witness of all historical facts, because his 
account lacks causal connections.  “A particular thing or occurrence acquires historical 
significance in virtue of its relations to some other thing or occurrence in which we happen to 
have some special interest, or to which we attach some importance, for whatever reason,” Danto 
says (Danto 1962, 167).  The Ideal Chronicle, however, does not contain that historical 




facts, but because it does not assign significance or meaning to events, it does not contain 
understanding of those facts, and thus cannot provide a tool for understanding, as a narrative can. 
Danto’s IC is non-narrative as he simply has all of the facts, but does not assign 
significance among those facts.  This is obviously not the way human consciousness works. The 
selection of facts by a human, and the assigning of varying degrees of significance among those 
facts already implies by default Narrativity. History seems to require both Narrativity and 
narrative thinking.  In selecting and giving priority to events/facts we already use our coherence-
seeking capacity.  In virtue of that priority selection, the events must have some nontrivial 
property already, since we make that selection based on the significance we assign them. 
This account, which provides us with some analogous reflections on the mental life of 
the   episodic, who would seem to fail to make narrative connections over the course of her life, 
also has consequences for how we relate to our futures, and how we create and carry out 
projects.  As I have noted, projects can be simple and short-term, such as Strawson’s case of 
making coffee, or longer term and more open ended, such as the project Danto explores in his 
examination of narrative sentences, planting roses (Danto 1962).  Danto says that we cannot use 
project verbs such as "planting roses" without making claims on the future.  Narrative sentences, 
he points out, are normally used to describe actions.  This Ideal Chronicle would lack at least 
four of the five criteria mentioned above that Noel Carroll (Carroll 2001, 126) lays out for 
narrative connection, retaining only -- possibly, “(1) the discourse represents at least two events 
and/or states of affairs.” 
To be a person who viewed their life completely without narrative, the way the Ideal 
Chronicler does, would mean not making causal connections.  Besides the obvious effect this 




projects.  Danto even poses the question of whether the Ideal Chronicler is deprived of the entire 
language of action.  The mental reality of the Ideal Chronicler, for that matter, is contrary to the 
nature of human thought, which seems to inherently seek connections, causal or otherwise. 
It seems like the Ideal Chronicler would still have “knowledge how,” though actions 
attributed to him would be reduced to the Aristotelian concept of knowing by doing.  In the case 
of projects, however, we have a concept of “knowing-that,” which would include “that” 
actions.  So, if we were to ask the Ideal Chronicler what he was doing when he was digging 
holes, he wouldn’t be able to reply “planting roses,” since this is a project that presupposes a 
range of causally connected behavior, such as R1-- fertilizing the ground; R2 -- digging; R3 -- 
smoking his pipe; R4 -- hiring expert gardeners; etc.  As Danto explains, the range of R-ing will 
be different for everyone, but the point is that the Ideal Chronicler cannot be engaged in R-ing, 
since he cannot make claims on the future.  
To understand the full relevance of these two discussions of narrative versus 
nonnarrative, it is worth going back to look at Danto’s full description of the Ideal Chronicler: “I 
want to insert an Ideal Chronicler into my picture.  He knows whatever happens the moment it 
happens, even in other minds.  And he is to have the gift of instantaneous transcription: 
everything that happens across the whole forward rim of the Past is set down by him, as it 
happens, the way it happens.  The resultant running account I shall term the Ideal Chronicle 
(hereafter referred to as I.C.)  We may now think of the various parts of the I.C. as accounts to 
which practicing historians endeavor to make their accounts approximate.  Let us say that every 
event in the past now has its full description shelved somewhere in the historian’s 




modification of the events could force a modification in the I.C. But this is ruled out.  The I.C. is 
then necessarily definitive” (Danto 1962, 152). 
As Danto stresses in his thought experiment, though the work done by the Ideal 
Chronicler is definitive, it might be given over to a machine.  This is not only because he lacks 
the human ability to make connections among past events, but also because he is unable to 
speculate and project consequences into the future.  “The whole truth concerning an event can 
only be known after, and sometimes only long after the event itself has taken place,” Danto 
says.  So what The I.C. was deliberately not equipped with was the perspective given by looking 
back at an event from the future.  And this is the part of the story that historians are employed 
for.  Only a historian from the future can say when the 30 Years War began-- if that war was so 
called because of its duration. 
So the Ideal Chronicler is not allowed to make any claims on the future.  Such inability 
prevents him from being able to employ so-called narrative sentences.  There is no beginning and 
no ending for the Ideal Chronicler, so there are no stories for him.  The account he gives would 
not even resemble documentaries, since producing documentaries presupposes a narrative skill.  
We would have to grant knowledge of causal consequences to the IC if he were to 
become able to write a history book.  This is how Danto's historian would acquire the capacity to 
write history, a narrative of the events.   
Aristotle makes a further distinction regarding the relative values of kinds of narratives 
when he asserts that poetry is more philosophical and more significant than history because for 
him, history simply describes things that have happened necessarily, but poetry speaks about 
things that can happen, that are possible to happen.  We can see that in Aristotle’s terms, history 




The epistemological significance of poetry for Aristotle strikes me as an important 
insight.  The claim that some Universals could only be understood through narrative engagement 
with particulars that embody those Universals indicates the importance of narrative for our 
understanding.  For Aristotle, Universals can be understood when they are embodied in the life 
of characters that unfold those possible events (particulars) through language, thought and action 
and those are not static “dead and accompli”, but are dynamically extended in time. Our 
understanding of such concepts as jealousy, pride or generosity can be enriched and expanded by 
seeing them embodied in narratives from outside our own individual experience.  Obviously, 
philosophy often uses narrative tools for understanding.  Often concepts are better understood 
through vivid narrative examples that either could have a factual basis or lead us to realization 
through an increasingly fashionable tool in philosophy, such as thought experiments, myths or 
literary dialogues (traditionally originated with Platonic dialogues) or examples from literature 
and works of art.  To question the soundness of an argument, i.e. whether premises and 
conclusion make sense, we have to entertain possible scenarios that could undermine or support 
soundness, and have to be equipped with narrative cognitive techniques. One has to consider 
alternative or counter examples in imagination that might challenge the plausibility of the 
statement.  
When Aristotle says that history is only concerned with facts, he does not mean that 
events are presented without interpretation, not connected in any way, stated independently of 
anyone’s subjective account, or outside of time, but that the subject is a particular unalterable 
series of events. I.e., the facts of Trojan War will be: The Greeks attacked Troy; they fought for 




Universals from those events, but only an understanding of that particular series of 
events.  Therefore, history, he says, doesn’t have the epistemological value that poetry does.  
This epistemological value of poetry for Aristotle arises because poetry does lead us to an 
understanding of Universals, because we have particulars as possible actions, not necessary 
ones.  When we read of the Trojan War in Homer’s The Iliad, as opposed to in a history, Achilles 
still kills Hector, but in the history he does it out of necessity -- that is, because he actually did 
kill Hector. In The Iliad, Achilles and Hector are characters, with personality traits.  In Achilles 
we see a character who is ruled by pride.  In Hector, one who is virtuous, noble and motivated by 
sense of duty to his family and his city. Because we know these characteristics, we are able to 
abstract to dynamic action of characters as types of people who are likely to do or say certain 
kinds of things, not simply as individuals.  Exactly from those actions we learn about the 
concepts of jealousy, pride, virtue and nobility.  Achilles and Hector become embodiments of 
those concepts, allowing us to grasp them. 
Looking at the Ideal Chronicle, history and poetry, we see three levels of knowledge.  In 
the IC, we know all the facts in a series of events, but the Ideal Chronicler is unable to observe 
any causal connections.  What he lacks -- beyond our experience of time -- I would claim, is the 
synthetic capacity.  He cannot assign importance to events and synthesize them into a single 
account that could be called a story, a narrative.   
The historian does have the synthetic capacity, because she makes causal connections 
between events, allowing her to discern degrees of importance.  She sees the series of events in 
terms of a narrative, and through that narrative is able to provide an understanding of meaning 
that an Ideal Chronicle does not provide.  But, again, according to Aristotle, that meaning does 




might see that what happened to Helen is a significant event in writing a Trojan War story, but 
would look beyond that to the form of the actions, which allows him to see the Universals. 
Danto’s historian might perceive the events of political interest of the two sides as playing an 
important role in the story of the war, but she is looking at the particulars of the specific historic 
event.  The sophist Gorgias wrote a defense of Helen of Troy, exploring the power of persuasion 
through rhetoric.  
It makes a difference who is going to write a history book, poem, novel or play.  The poet 
has to think and to make narrative connections, so the product, a narrative, is produced.  The 
poet is not an Ideal Chronicler; he has to judge events from the perspective of existence in time 
and prioritize events according to his discriminative selective capacity as well as project in his 
imagination the importance of his account for the future.  To do this, the poet must look beyond 
the particulars to the universals of which those particulars are unique instances.  So while a 
historian employs narrative thinking, in order to create a plausible account of a past event, the 
poet is engaged in Narrativity, going beyond the particulars to form finding which allows him to 
project possibility and convey meaning beyond particulars. 
Aristotle’s epistemological claim that poetry is more philosophical than history relies on 
the poet’s ability to reach beyond the narrative nexus, extend them from necessity to the realm of 
possibility and discern patterns that could introduce Universals.  As he says, (Aristotle, Poetics, 
1451b3) “The difference between a historian and a poet is …that one tells what happened and the 
other what might happen.  For this reason poetry is something more scientific and serious than 
history, because poetry tends to give general truths while history gives particular 
facts.”  Aristotle, with his view that poetry has epistemological value while history does not, 




powers to bring one to a higher form-finding state, where realization of Universals is 
achieved.  The power of imagination engaged by poetry is thus capable of elevating one to the 
Platonic realm of forms where we can have a grasp of the idea and discern the patterns of a 
possible occurrence of the events of a given type and learn about characters as types of people 
who are likely to do or to say certain things. The mere connection of specific facts in history, for 
Aristotle, doesn’t provide synthesis beyond the specific events of the history, and doesn’t get us 
to the state of form-finding or pattern recognition, which poetry does in a dynamic and artful 
way. 
The greatest artistic tool of the poet, whom Aristotle calls “the maker of the narrative,” is 
metaphor, which as he describes it is a form finding, “For the right use of metaphor means an eye 
for resemblances.” (Aristotle, Poetics, 1459a17)  That “eye for resemblances” that Aristotle 
refers to in the application of metaphors is one’s ability to discern patterns, to see how properties 
of A could be applied to B, when A and B are not identical, but on the basis of selection or 
recognition of that special analogy of identity in difference.  In metaphor, the connection of 
certain properties in A that could applied to B are recognized not through literal meaning, but 
beyond it on the basis of analogy.  The metaphor “Juliet is the sun” picks up only those 
properties that hold between them. We cannot — and do not want to — attribute all of the 
properties of the sun to Juliet, but only those that selectively discern strong identity in difference. 
The genius of the poet who has a mastery of the use of metaphor is the ability to pick up only 
those properties that would convey most the experience desired in this identity in difference.  So 
reading “Juliet is the sun,” we do not think, “What, she’s a massive ball of burning 
gas?”  Rather, we understand that she is warm, radiant, perhaps even essential to the hero’s life, 




Although Aristotle says that excellence in metaphor “cannot be learnt; it is the token of 
genius,” (Aristotle, Poetics, 1459a17) the impulse to make these form-finding connections is 
inherent.  Metaphor is found in all literatures, across all ages.  As such, it is part of the form 
finding process of Narrativity, seeking connections and identity in difference across various 
events and experiences. 
Ted Cohen, in Thinking of Others: the Talent for Metaphor (Cohen 2009), explicitly links 
metaphor to the form finding of Narrativity, when he proposes that in thinking of our past and 
future selves, we engage in metaphor-making:  
 
The imagination of oneself in the future is one of the most common of our 
contemplations. It is the background and prelude to countless decisions ranging from a 
decision about what career to pursue to the choice of what to have for dinner. 
I regard this act of imagination, too, as the grasping of a metaphor.  Identifying oneself 
with another person is a special case of metaphorical identification, and identifying 
oneself with oneself-differently-situated is, thus, a special case (Cohen 2009, 68). 
 
Thus the projection of one towards the future is imagining oneself, finding an identity in 
difference that relies again on the idea of form finding and perhaps seeing oneself as different 
character in the story.  
The truth of Aristotle’s claim for the epistemological value of poetry can be seen in the 
fact that the explanation of some abstract concepts would be problematic without a narrative 
engagement of some sort.  For example, explaining the concept of Love, one might want to read 
Romeo and Juliet and undergo an “as if” experience of love.  In this manner we could get closer 
to understanding a concept through our cognitive engagement or a simulated mental process, i.e. 
one that brings about the possibility of a similar mental experience, even if it is experience 
entertained in imagination “as if’ it were one actually experienced, or what it is like to be in such 




connections similar to those that a person has who is having love experiences.  A comparable 
situation might be psychological experiments, when we would be simulated to be in a state of a 
“not quite” real situation, which still requires narrative engagement.  Narrativity is brought about 
once one is engaged with Poetry to its highest realm of reflection and pattern recognition, which 
has a high epistemological significance for Aristotle.  Two ways this can be achieved are: 1, by 
presenting narratives in which extraneous details are removed so we can see the universal forms 
more clearly, and 2, by giving us a stock of possible histories that we can use as data to learn to 
abstract the Universals over time. 
Danto’s Ideal Chronicler, the hero of his thought experiment, lacks the cognitive power 
to make causal connections.  I think it would be fair to say that the IC is not a promising poet and 
is not a philosopher.  His collection of facts would only provide us with information, data, 
without any understanding of what that data might mean or how to understand it.  So we cannot 
consider that Danto’s IC has any epistemological capacity, because of his inability to use 
narrative sentences and thus to become engaged in the cognitive nexus of Narrativity.  
All of the above makes sense, but what is missing here is that in constructing an historical 
account we still aim only toward a tentative narrative, which is work that requires a human effort 
and work that the Ideal Chronicler cannot do.  The historian is proposing a reading of a particular 
series of events.  But that reading could change or be undermined as time unfolds.  New facts or 
details could perhaps be uncovered, and the significance of some events could diminish, while 
the significance of others would be increased, or the entire structure of the historical narrative 
could have to be rewritten.  The recent discovery of a previously unknown Viking settlement in 
Newfoundland is one example, because it proved that the Vikings’ exploration and engagement 




archaeological discoveries in Europe have forced anthropologists to reconsider what they 
thought was the story of the interactions between the pre-human Cro Magnons and Neanderthals, 
and even to entirely reconsider the story of Neanderthal society and level of development.  
The Ideal Chronicler would have no understanding of why an account would need to be 
corrected in such ways, instead merely adding the new specifics to the previous list.  It would not 
require the IC to revise how other particulars in the list are presented, because there is no 
assigning of meaning.  Even something as seemingly simple as “first arrival of Vikings in North 
America,” would not be part of the Ideal Chronicle, because the word “first” would assume 
connections between events. The Ideal Chronicler does not make such connections, and does not 
consider why the same events might aim at different truths at different times.  
I would like to make a parallel and say that our mental events function in a similar 
fashion to this continual reconsidering of proposed readings of events, as though we were 
historians who were continually exploring the same subject and possibly as open to revising our 
own account as we might be concerned about defending it.  Danto touches on this aspect when 
he argues that it is possible that some events have not yet “discharged their causal energy,” i.e., 
if we have E1 and E2, it doesn’t guarantee that E1 causes E2, since E2 could be caused by Ex, 
which preceded E1 a long time ago.  Danto claims that Ex could be one of any events earlier in 
the time scale that “simply have not yet discharged their causal energy, but have lain dormant all 
these centuries, like a volcano. This is surely an extravagant proposal, but the causes in question 
obviously precede their proposed effects, so the incapacity of the Past to change can no longer be 
charged to the temporal asymmetry of cause and effect.  Moreover, we cannot simply say that 




past, be causally inoperative -- for this would immediately entail a general argument against 
causality: our concept of causality requires action at a temporal distance.”  
The dormant causes claim in Danto strikes me as relevant to the nature of our mental 
experiences. In a way here the construction of an historical narrative could tell us something 
about our narrative thinking, i.e., the phenomena of memory could discharge the past 
experiences into present and future ones, and could even change how we project and plan future 
actions. The Proustian madeleine is a vivid example of an involuntary memory -- one of Danto’s 
“dormant causes.”  Further, involuntary memories could be likened to chance historical finds, 
such as when a farmer uncovers an ancient bone or artifact that leads anthropologists to new 
discoveries.  Such an event was seen recently when a previously unknown battlefield was 
uncovered in northern Europe, leading historians to completely re-examine what they thought 
they knew about ancient society in that area.  For us, involuntary memory can act as that kind of 
discovery, making us re-evaluate what we thought we knew about ourselves, or the meaning of 
events in our past.  Similarly, we can see new experiences in the light of ones that precede them, 
which we hold in memory. 
The IC is unable to provide a humanly coherent account of events since causes for him 
cannot be witnessed as causes.  Such a predicate as "a cause of" would not be accessible to the 
IC, and in general his use of language would be necessarily limited, because of the many terms 
that imply or require a temporal relationship.  By Danto’s account, none of those terms would be 
available to the IC.  Even if some causal connections might be considered objective facts, as 
some people argue, those connections would unavailable to the IC.  Indeed, we are narrative just 
by virtue of having language, and one could see action as unfolding in a realm of thoughts and 




when one is thinking and one performs speech acts when one is using language. The poet acts as 
his mental content manifests itself through language and finds its embodiment in poems through 
characters, the gardener performs a long range of actions, which make claims on the future and 
might find its embodiment in the garden or not 
Many verbs and terms logically require the occurrence of an event later than E1, such as 
"began," "preceded," "gave rise to."  Husserl also notices that even some nouns of time need a 
causal account to be used, i.e. “today” suggests that there is yesterday and tomorrow.  As Ricour 
says in his Time and Narrative, if we didn’t have the phenomenon notion of the present as 
“today,” in terms of which there is a “tomorrow” and “yesterday,” we wouldn’t be able to make 
sense of a new event.  Needless to say, all sentences that make use of those terms in the obvious 
way will then be narrative sentences, which "refer to at least two time-separated events and 
describe the earlier event" (Danto 1962, 161).  As Danto says, " ...in a sense this structure is also 
exhibited by a whole class of sentences normally used to describe actions" (Danto 162, 161). 
To go beyond Husserl’s and Ricoeur’s claims regarding nouns of time, there are many 
nouns and adjectives that are not apparently temporal, yet that require the occurrence of previous 
events, for example “redeemed” assumes that one has sinned, “death” presupposes life and 
“birth” presupposes conception and pregnancy.  Thus, even seemingly temporally static terms by 
implication place themselves in a temporal context and carry narrative meaning.  On the other 
hand, all verbs at least imply a narrative, because they deal with acts, which exist temporally and 
entail a beginning, a duration and an end (closure), even if the beginning and end are not explicit 
in the form of the verb.  This inherent temporality of so much of language, and thus by 
implication of human thought, indicates the essential impossibility of Danto’s IC being 




Looking at the relationship between narrative sentences and action, Danto examines what 
he calls project verbs, a common linguistic structure that creates connections between behavior 
among which the relationship might not otherwise be apparent.  "The range of behavior covered 
by ‘is planting roses’ includes digging, fertilizing, sowing even purchasing shovels and seeds, 
even reading seed catalogues or hiring expert gardeners," Danto says (Danto 1962, 164).  Thus 
there is a problem in describing actions, unless we understand that the relationships between 
them may be stronger or weaker, direct or indirect, yet still hold.  It may be true of a man that he 
is engaged in R-ing and that a project verb, such as “planting roses,” might be true of him at a 
time when no term from the range B1...Bn is true of him. 
Interestingly enough, to be engaged in the process of R-ing would only assume making a 
weak claim on the future.  A man in the process of operations that could be called “planting 
roses” is not guaranteed a result.  As Danto says, "But if roses fail to come forth , this does not 
falsify our proposition, so long as he did whatever might, by current criteria of rosiculture, count 
as planting roses" (Danto 1962, 164).  Danto seems to focus on the process or experience of R-
ing as opposed to the result achieved.  Operations that might constitute R-ing are merely 
necessary, but not sufficient for R as such.  While engaged in R-ing, a man can make weaker or 
stronger claims on the future, but not achieving R doesn't falsify the proposition that "a man is R-
ing."  Danto stresses the necessity of process as such and I'll bring up this claim to the necessity 
of Narrativity in mundane actions if we are to be engaged in any projects.  The question could be 
raised whether a character like Oblomov is already R-ing when he is lying in his bed, dreaming 
about the things he would do to R, telling his servant Zakhar or his friends about his great plans 




acts of R-ing.  He has the Narrativity of R-ing, the projection of himself R-ing, even though that 
narrative and projection never materialize in any other action.  
To take this further, a man obviously could be engaged in many projects at the same time, 
i.e. more than one project verb may be true of an individual during the same time stretch.  If we 
were to recount a story of a woman’s motherhood, we would select those events from her life 
that fit in accordance to the project performed.  If we were to recount a story of the same person 
writing a book, we would have to assign significance to completely different events, and the two 
accounts would not even necessarily include all the same actions. 
What is the connection between Aristotle’s poet, Danto’s historian and a person engaged 
in a long-term project such as planting roses?  All of them create narratives and what connects 
them is the narrative process in which they all are engaged: to write a poem or a work of history 
and to make coffee require this process.  The insufficiency of Danto’s IC, and the distinction 
Aristotle makes between the relative values of history, which only provides us with knowledge 
of particulars without allowing us the possibility to gain understanding of universals from them, 
versus poetry, show the unique value and necessity of narrative for human understanding. 
We can see from Danto’s discussion of project verbs, which just by using we necessarily 
make claims on the future and therefore have a projection -- even if subconscious, 
unacknowledged or dormant -- towards the future, how narrative is an inextricable part of 
language.  Such projection, which the common usage of such verbs indicates is an inherent and 
perhaps necessary aspect of our mental activity, just is Narrativity.  It is, to return to Carroll’s 
five criteria, a mental act that involves “(1) ... at least two events and/or states of affairs (2) in a 
globally forward-looking manner (3) concerning the career of at least one unified subject (4) 




ordered, and (5) where the earlier events in the sequence are at least causally necessary 
conditions for the causation of later events and/or states of affairs (or are contributions thereto)” 
(Carroll 2001, 126).   
Having previously referred to us as “historians of self,” in this chapter I have shown what 
it means to be a historian, attempting to find causal connections among series of events to create 
a narrative that assigns significance and thus provides understanding.  I have shown analogies 
between the process of a historian with our own examination of memory to create coherent 
narratives, and how both are proposed as possible narratives, because new discoveries can lead to 
a reweighing of significance among past events.  Further, I have shown how language is 
weighted with temporality, requiring that we make — whether consciously or unconsciously — 
causal connections between events, indicating that Narrativity is an inherent aspect of our mental 
activity.  I have also shown how our examination of our pasts is analogous to how we plan and 
project into the future, creating possible narratives that must be continually revised in the light of 
new events. 
I will return now to where I started the chapter — to Strawson’s dismissal of a 
Narrativity that he accepts as trivial, that of simple projects such as making coffee.  I will argue 
that such cases, while perhaps initially trivial, are slippery slopes, that can carry us from the 







‘Trivial’ Narrativity and the Slippery Slope 
Strawson argues that any Narrativity he might exhibit is merely trivial, and does not open 
him to the larger claim that he is a narrative person.  Leaving aside the account, previously 
raised, that he gives of how he came to write his book arguing against his own Narrativity, I 
assert that any claim of triviality of action falls into a slippery slope argument.  We could look at 
a man smoking a pipe and say that this is trivial, he is simply smoking a pipe. However that 
activity could just be a necessary fragment of a larger project, that — even if it is a pause from 
action, possibly for reflection or rest — it is one of a series of activities that constitutes this 
project. 
But what if one is enjoying the experience of making coffee? Obviously this example is 
connected to doing-how, not doing-that. If some of our actions could be simply reduced to mere 
doings or even bodily movements, then the question “how?” would make them purely episodic 
with no projection forward whatsoever. However, when there is a presupposition of doing “that” 
and we have some sort of intention involved beyond the bodily physical algorithm of making 
coffee, the triviality claim becomes a slippery slope argument. The trivial act of making coffee 
every day could lead us to think about what we know about making coffee.  We could begin to 
think about how we carefully select coffee beans, choose how to grind them, choose a method of 
coffee making for a certain mood, time of day or type of coffee.  Making coffee could motivate 
one to experiment with adding spices, chocolate and condiments, having a new experience each 
time the action is performed.  We could become so involved in the process and feel we had 
learned so much, we could decide to open a coffee shop.  Eventually we might become so 
engaged in the subject that we would write and submit an article about coffee, and then 




scale, when a child makes coffee for the first time, she has to learn the causal sequence of each 
step of the action consciously, paying careful attention to the coherence of the action.  So if an 
action like making coffee can be considered a trivial example of Narrativity, it is only because it 
can be internalized.  Initially, however, the narrative must be created, examined and referred to, 
or the project will not be carried out successfully.  But the Narrativity is still there, and can 
resurface.  Indeed, being “in the moment” of making coffee would not mean being in any 
particular instant in the process, but rather being in that instant only as a part of the entire process 
— an instant within a narrative. 
Thus the triviality of any action becomes a matter of degree, since one could see that each 
experience as such of making coffee could bring significance into one’s life.  Of course not 
everything fits into large scale projects, but even so the triviality of any action cannot be 
assigned by default to any of our actions and the scope of the Narrativity argument remains 
entirely subjective.  
Narrativity as a mental component of our experience is a necessary condition for 
performing other cognitive tasks that involve coherence seeking and form-finding tendencies, 
such as making sense of our mundane experience, as well necessary epistemologically. 
Narrativity is also the mental component we engage when we initiate actions, whether on a 
trivial scale, such as making coffee, or for larger projects. To approach the issue from another 
end, any discussion of actions requires an appeal to the narrative nature of our experience, the 
necessity of which is demonstrated in the language that must be used.  This necessity extends to 
our mental activity because the way we are engaged in project making linguistically, our mental 






Replies to Challenges 
 
Experience of Time: Being in the ‘Now’ and the Possibility of Episodic Experience 
Strawson’s objection to the psychological or descriptive theory of narrativity -- both CN 
and, as I take it, Narrativity as process as I claim -- is based in his assertion that he feels himself 
only in the Now, and he feels no strong connection between the Self he is now, and the Selves he 
has been in the past or will be in the future.  To answer this, and to see how a person like 
Strawson feels -- taking him at his word that this is truly how he feels -- we must look at what 
the Now means, and by extension, how we experience time. 
It might seem that when one refers to the Now, the present, in this way, they are taking it 
as a discrete time slice, somehow taken out of the flow of time.  While this sense of Now as a 
time slice may be useful for certain kinds of thought experiments, it is clearly not what Strawson 
has in mind.  I take it that he does not see time as a kind of line that can be dissected into an 
infinite series of separate points, but rather a constant flow.  And this flow seems to be paralleled 
in his feeling of his connection to his past a future Selves, i.e., the further removed in time, it 
seems, the less feeling of connection he has. 
If the Now, the present, is not a time slice -- static and discrete -- what is it?  One of the 
most common metaphors for the passage of time is a person sitting in a moving vehicle, a car or 
train, with the world passing by outside the window.  So that in the same way we are always 
Here, but where Here is constantly somewhere else, somewhere new, we are always in the 




disappearing around the Now, which gives rise to such forward-looking emotions as expectation 
and hope, and anxiety and fear, and their backward-looking corollaries, such as nostalgia and 
regret.    
William James has a notion of specious present -- that the present moment is extended 
and the retrospective and prospective sense of time give continuity to the stream of 
consciousness. 
In short, the practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a 
certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two 
directions into time. The unit of composition of our perception of time is a duration, with 
a bow and a stern, as it were--a rearward--and a forward-looking end. It is only as parts of 
this duration-block that the relation of succession of one end to the other is perceived. We 
do not first feel one end and then feel the other after it, and from the perception of the 
succession infer an interval of time between, but we seem to feel the interval of time as a 
whole, with its two ends embedded in it (James 1890, 609). 
His choice of the term “saddle-back” is useful, because besides its shape it carries in it the sense 
of motion, since a saddle is used to ride a horse, and thus to travel.  Likewise the notions of a 
bow and stern are completed by a boat, which is a vehicle used to move.  So the present, while 
having some duration itself, is also not something static.  And as a consequence, for James the 
beginning and the end of the extended present that one occupies at any given “now” aren't 
fixed.  He turns to the metaphor of watching out the window of a moving vehicle (James 1890, 
611):  
To 'realize ' a quarter of a mile we need only look out of the window and feel its length 
by an act which, though it may in part result from organized associations, yet seems 
immediately performed. To realize an hour, we must count 'now!-now!-Now!-Now!’ -- 
indefinitely. Each 'now' is the feeling of a separate bit of time, and the exact sum of the 
bits never makes a very clear impression on our mind.  
 
To speak meaningfully of the present, the now, we have to define what is meant by the 




slice or a constantly shifting set of perceptions, it must have some duration.  James set the 
parameters of that duration as the amount of time it would take our brains to assimilate all of the 
sense data we receive into a unified experience.  This seems right, leaving aside whether his 
measure of that process is approximately three seconds is correct.  I suspect that the duration of 
“Now” could be flexible, depending on the urgency and complexity of the data received.  It may 
be that in instants of stress or danger, the “Now” is compressed into a shorter span, as our brains 
instinctively focus on only the perceptions related to the threat.  At times of relaxation, pleasure 
or aesthetic appreciation, however, the “Now” might stretch out longer, both because of the lack 
of obvious urgency of any particular aspect of perceptions, and thus the complexity of sorting 
them out and assimilating them into a totality, and because of a desire -- conscious or not -- to 
extend the experience, to remain in and retain it. 
How long any “Now,” taken as the time span needed to assimilate any given set of 
perceptions, can be extended is obviously problematic.  To return to the metaphor of riding in a 
vehicle, there is a sense in which we are not simply passengers, but also have some limited 
control.  That is, we can turn our heads to see what is coming, can follow an object or scene as 
we pass through, focusing our attention on it as long as possible, until it is finally out of sight 
behind us.  But we can neither stop the train nor speed it up, and we cannot make it circle back 








Proust, Time Regained and Madeleine Moments as Candidates for Episodicity 
But why should we ever want to circle back?  If as Strawson and others say, there is little 
or no connection to past Selves, there would hardly seem to be any reason to.  The Now is where 
we live, so let’s stay here.  Yet, oddly enough, Marcel Proust, who Strawson suggests as an 
episodic like himself, provides one answer, even as he clearly indicates that he at least 
sometimes feels little or no connection to his former selves. 
Yes: if, owing to the work of oblivion , the returning memory can throw no bridge, form 
no connecting link between itself and the present minute, if it remains in the context of its 
own place and date, if it keeps its distance, its isolation in the hollow of a valley or upon 
the highest peak of a mountain summit, for this very reason it causes us suddenly to 
breathe a new air, an air which is new precisely because we have breathed it in the past, 
that purer air which the poets have vainly tried to situate in paradise and which could 
induce so profound a sensation of renewal only if it had been breathed before, since the 
true paradises are the paradises that we have lost (Proust 1981, 903). 
For Proust, even when “the returning memory” remains somehow foreign, unconnected and “can 
form no link between itself and the present,” by its very distance it immerses one more 
powerfully into the past, because it is the paradise lost, the paradise that exists only in 
imagination.  So the as-if experience of the past retains a property of pleasure.  
The truth surely was that the being within me which had enjoyed these impressions had 
enjoyed them because they had in them something that was common to a day long past 
and to the present, because in some way they were extra-temporal, and this being made 
its appearance only when, through one of these identifications of the present with the 
past, it was likely to find itself in the one and only medium in which it could exist and 
enjoy the essence of things, that is outside of time. This explained why it was that my 
anxiety on the subject of my death had ceased at the moment when I had unconsciously 
recognized the taste of the little madeleine, since the being which at that moment I had 
been was an extra-temporal being and therefore unalarmed by the vicissitudes of the 
future (Proust 1981, 904). 
Proust's madeleine experience puts him outside of time as an extra-temporal being.  He is 




become less concerned about what will happen to him.  Strawson might see such a being as an 
episodic one.  Even as he has the memory, he is not really in the past, he escapes the present and 
he is unalarmed by the future.  That is a posited in imagination extra-temporal location that 
happens to Proust involuntarily, he cannot dictate the experience, it revisits him accidentally, it 
brings him to "as if" experience of his past self and to the highest state of felicity and pleasure, 
though also filled with anguish of the lack of presence.  Even if we are to consider this as a 
possible experience of an episodic, it still has duration and cannot last indefinitely. 
And yet, Proust admits himself that life is lived in Time and those extra-temporal 
experiences suppress that mighty dimension of time: 
...Time seemed to dispose the different elements of my life, had, by making me reflect 
that in a book which tried to tell the story  of a life it would be necessary to use not the 
two-dimensional psychology which we normally use but a quite different sort of three-
dimensional psychology, added a new beauty to those resurrections of the past which my 
memory had effected while i was following my thoughts alone in the library, since 
memory by itself, when it introduces the past, unmodified, into the present -- the past just 
as it was at the moment when it was itself the present -- suppresses the mighty dimension 
of Time which is the dimension in which life is lived (Proust 1981, 1087). 
 
    As Proust has shown, even for an Episodic, Narrativity holds, at the very least because of the 
often involuntary character of memory.  Former selves are recalled to us by experiences we do 
not control, and when they are, we are confronted with a temporal relationship between one Self 
and another, through the person we are.  Even if the response to the memory is a disbelieving 
“that was me?” it can only be understood in narrative terms, because only through narrative can 







Self as Mental Object: Even a ‘Man Without Qualities’ Narrativizes 
In his argument against Narrativity as an essential property of the experiencing mind, and 
against the notion of an enduring Self, which he defines as the subject of experience, Galen 
Strawson turns repeatedly to literary examples to make his case, among them Robert Musil’s 
Man Without Qualities (Musil 1996). Aside from the obvious irony of using narratives to argue 
against Narrativity, Musil presents several problems for Strawson’s argument.  Ulrich may be a 
“Man Without Qualities,” but he is not a man without a past, and not a man whose past selves 
are not relevant to his current Self.  He is also a man who considers the future.  Drawing on 
Nietzsche, Musil presents the Self as the project of “becoming.”  Rather than the subject of 
experience, for Musil the Self is an object of thought, a mental object.   
Musil’s aesthetic acknowledges and explores the fractured nature of our mental activity, 
recognizing how reason, emotion, morality, instinct and unconscious physiological responses 
often contradict and struggle with one another.  Rather than accept this mental disunity, he 
suggests that the Self is an essential mental object, even though it is a construct that requires 
continual effort.  This effort, I argue, is Narrativity, that is, form finding over time, whereby the 
flux of experience is shaped and reshaped in a constant “becoming.”   Strawson may think a 
“Man Without Qualities” is a paradigm case of an episodic, but Musil presents him as a man of 
possibilities, who projects himself into the future through possible narratives -- through 
Narrativity. 
Strawson takes Musil as a writer who is presenting what he calls the Episodic outlook, 
that is, a person who “does not figure oneself, considered as self, as something that was there in 




opposes to what he calls the Diachronic, which is a person who does feel that she has a Self that 
endures over time. 
In his discussion of Narrativity, he further argues that there are also people who are 
narrative and those who are non-narrative.  He suggests that there may be Episodics who are 
either one, though it seems to him less likely that there could be non-narrative Diachronics.  I 
think that his framing of the argument also makes it highly unlikely that there could be narrative 
Episodics. 
He does not claim that there are no Narrative people, or that there shouldn’t be, but rather 
that not everyone is Narrative and there is no reason to be.  But his argument is extreme because 
of how he defines Narrativity: “experiencing or conceiving one’s life as a narrative” (Strawson 
2005, 63). He is not the only one to describe Narrativity in this way. Even many who argue for it 
as a positive outlook describe it as seeing oneself as a character in a story, or as Daniel Dennett 
says, “We try to make all of our material cohere into a single good story” (Dennett 1992).  I 
believe it is going too far to speak of “all of our material,” but finding coherence, even if only 
about the immediate past and future, is what Narrativity is about.  
As argued earlier, it is more productive to think of Narrativity as a mental process, what I 
call “Narrativizing,” which does not presuppose a completed narrative and does not necessarily 
even establish the type of narrative arc expected in traditional works of fiction.  Instead, it is a 
constant consideration of the Self within the flux of time, considering the past and projecting into 
the future.  As argued in the previous chapter, it can function on levels as mundane as setting 
about to make coffee, or as complex as embarking on a career, a marriage, etc.  Rather than 
seeing one’s life as a story, Narrativity means experiencing and thinking about one’s life making 




between two or more events or states of affairs that are temporally ordered, concerning at least 
one unified subject -- in this case a Self, and the earlier events are at least causally necessary 
conditions for the causation of the later events. 
It may seem hard to see how a person fitting Strawson’s definition of an Episodic could 
exhibit Narrativity at all.  The episodic person, he says, feels that there has been a succession of 
selves within his life, and feels little or no connection with his former selves, or with the selves 
who may follow in the life of the human being he is.  The episodic, he says, is engaged only with 
the present.  Strawson, calling himself an episodic, admits what he calls the “present shaping 
consequences of the past,” (Strawson 2004, 438) but says he does not “have any great or special 
interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future,” (Strawson 2005, 433) 
which seems inconsistent.  We also cannot leave aside the issue of the constant appearing of the 
present -- that the present is not a static instant taken out of time but rather a constantly changing 
position within time, and thus that even being only in the present does not mean being out of 
time. 
For Ulrich, Musil’s “Man Without Qualities,” his past selves are relevant to his current 
Self.  This is demonstrated by his recognition of the repetition of certain behaviors and 
responses, exemplified by the “forgotten, highly relevant story of the major’s wife.”  Ulrich 
recognizes himself playing out this story again and again at various times in the book.  This 
would indicate that for this episodic at least, a former Self is still relevant to the current 
Self.  The narrative of that Self has been replayed in other of his Selves and is replayed in the 
narrative of the current one.  Musil seems to be saying that to understand the Self we are now, 




Beyond that, Ulrich has in the past constructed narratives for himself -- the soldier, the 
engineer and the mathematician.  And while “he might shake his head in wonder ... about his 
previous incarnations,” the disbelief is not about Narrativity, but about the choices of 
narrative.  And it is clear that he recognizes that he is seeking a narrative, even if, during the time 
of the book, he is “taking a year off from his life.”  If, as Strawson would have it, Musil is 
presenting a character who is non-narrative, which I would dispute, it is at most only a character 
who is attempting a break from Narrativity, to which he intends to return. 
That Ulrich is not only concerned with the present can be seen in his relations with 
Bonadea.  He falls victim to competing desires.  Seeing her, feeling her physical presence, he 
wants the pleasure of having sex with her.  But hanging over that is the knowledge that then he 
will have to endure her conversation when it is over, which he increasingly cannot stand.  So 
when he finally breaks with her, he is in a sense sacrificing the present for the future.  He is 
denying a pleasure to his current self to spare a future self pain. 
One of the key issues in the book, raised early and recurring throughout, is the conflict 
between reality and possibility.  As Musil says: “If there is a sense of reality, there must also be a 
sense of possibility” (Musil 1996, 10).  Possibility is projection towards the future, that is power 
of the mind to project its intentionality, find form to its experience.  This is where “real life” 
experience unfolds while a story played out in mental life impinges with its sense of 
possibility.  What we see is Kant’s concept of imagination “as if” now applied to unfolding 
nows.  And because this “sense of possibility” exists in the flux of time, the only way to deal 
with it is through Narrativity. 
So in this sense imagination, which is the mental faculty engaged in conceiving 




Musil, as natural as any of our other senses, such that to lack it, would have to be considered a 
handicap, in the way that blindness or deafness is.  He says: “It is reality that awakens 
possibilities, and nothing would be more perverse than to deny it.  Even so, it will always be the 
same possibilities, in sum or on the average, that go on repeating themselves until a man comes 
along who doesn’t value the actuality above the idea.  It is he who first gives the new 
possibilities their meaning, their direction, and he awakens them” (Musil 1996, 12). 
This may be why Ulrich is a “Man Without Qualities”: because he is more attached to his 
own possibilities than he is to any qualities any one might ascribe to him.  But it also suggests 
that if the present is “reality,” the more deeply we engage with it, the more it will push us into 
the future and the consideration of possibilities.  One the one hand this is simple kinetics, and 
Musil implies that focussing too much on it is dangerous. 
“Everything we feel and do is somehow oriented ‘lifeward,’ and the least deviation away 
from this direction toward something beyond is difficult or alarming. This is true even of the 
simple act of walking: one lifts one’s center of gravity, pushes it forward, and lets it drop again --
and the slightest change, the merest hint of shrinking from this letting-oneself-drop-into-the-
future, or even of stopping to wonder at it -- and one can no longer stand upright” (Musil 1996, 
134). 
The recognition of this constant forward motion and its significance undermines the 
notion that reality and what is happening in the current moment is pre-eminent.  It forces us to 
face not only ambiguity but the unknown. 
“It’s never what one does that counts, but only what one does next,” (Musil 1996, 798) 
Ulrich says.  And then he goes even further (Musil 1996, 799): 
What I said was that one false step doesn’t matter, only the next step after that. But then 




nth step, the n-plus-one step! Such a person would have to live without ever coming to an 
end or to a decision, indeed without achieving reality.  And yet it is still true that what 
counts is always the next step.  The truth is, we have no proper method of dealing with 
this unending series. 
     
The solution proposed to the problem of “dealing with this unending series” makes a 
“Man Without Qualities” not the antithesis of the narrative person, but in fact the ideal of 
Narrativity, because by not attaching himself to any qualities, he becomes open to possibilities, 
just as the world appears. 
If he monitors his feelings, he finds nothing he can accept without reservation. He seeks a 
possible beloved but can’t tell whether it’s the right one; he is capable of killing without 
being sure that he will have to.  The drive of his own nature to keep developing prevents 
him from believing that anything is final and complete, yet everything he encounters 
behaves as though it were final and complete.  He suspects that the given order of things 
is not as solid as it pretends to be; no thing, no self, no form, no principle, is safe, 
everything is undergoing an invisible but ceaseless transformation, the unsettled holds 
more of the future than the settled, and the present is nothing but a hypothesis that has not 
yet been surmounted (Musil 1996, 269). 
 
This continuous developing and the lack of anything final or complete places Ulrich 
within the constant flow of time, and that temporal flow can only be made comprehensible by 
Narrativity.  Rather than denying Narrativity or an enduring Self, Musil is proposing a dynamic 
model, recognizing the ongoing mental process required as we experience the ceaseless flow of 
sensation, thought and events.  As we Narrativize (situate one’s self in the temporal flow), we 
create the Self, which is a mental object.  Such a mental object is a theoretical posit, that can be 
revised in response to this “ceaseless transformation,” in the way that a center of gravity shifts as 
we move.  And like a center of gravity, the Self is what we use to govern our contradictory 






Chapter 4                                                          
Narrativity and the Self 
If, as I have argued, Narrativity is essential for creating the Self, the question must be 
answered what the Self is, what function it performs, and whether it is necessary.  Arguments 
against the self range have come from many different sides, from neuroscience to Buddhism, but 
all are based on the notion that the Self is an illusion or a fiction.  If scientists have been thus far 
unable to isolate a specific part or parts of the brain that are involved in our perception of Self, 
some argue, then the Self must not exist.  Yet if it is an illusion, it is a deeply cherished 
one.  Rather than an illusion, though, the Self may be a creation, and as such -- like a work of art 
-- have a different kind of existence than other objects. 
I have defined the Self as the subject of experience, but this may need elaboration.  It is 
not merely a passive receptor of experience.  As the subject of experience, the Self is the 
organizing principle through which experience is processed.  For all experience, it is the sense of 
Self that allows us to feel, “This is happening to me,” and as such allows meaning to be 
assigned.  It is also what provides a basis for action, giving us reasons for doing one thing over 
another. 
That is not to argue that the Self is somehow concrete, stable, clearly defined or easily 
describable.  Think of wading in a rushing, rocky-bottomed river.  With each step, you must test 
the stability of the bottom you cannot clearly see.  You carefully apply your weight, feeling the 
stones shift under you until they settle into some kind of unseen solidity, and only then you can 
confidently -- if still carefully -- step forward.  Like the river bottom, the Self may be unstable 




be created, and I can step forward.  That it, as I face new experiences, I can assess both previous 
experiences and expectations for the future, and if a new experience is significant enough, I may 
reassess my own concept of myself.  
This metaphor, however, offers a vision of Self as a series of discrete, separate existences 
-- time slices -- without any essential or necessary continuity, other than the method by which 
each is identified.  All that matters is finding balance now, now, now.  As such, it allows for an 
argument against continuity of Self.  On the one hand, such an argument can be seen in 
Strawson’s assertion of himself as episodic, feeling little or perhaps no connection between the 
Self he is now and his past or future Selves.  This argument ignores the knowledge gained with 
each step, about feeling the shifting of the stones, about the strength of the current, and how to 
retain balance.  Taken to the extreme, such episodicity would put me in the position of having to 
ask, “What’s all this?” with each new step. 
Strawson, as I have said, is not making an argument that we shouldn’t be narrative or 
diachronic, just that not everyone is, and that there is no reason why we should be.  Derek Parfit, 
on the other hand, makes a prescriptive argument that we should not be attached to any strong 
connection between our Selves through time.  Because he attempts to draw on neuroscience as 
well as philosophies of selflessness such as Buddhism to make his case, it is worth taking a 
closer look at his arguments.  Though he does not talk about Narrativity as such, his argument 
against the value or even existence of a Self with any continuity at the very least implies that 
what I argue is the determining principle of Narrativity, the Self, is a falsehood that should be 






What Survival Means 
The thought experiment previously described in Borges’ “The Other,” which imagines 
the meeting of one person-slice with another from the same person, is not so different from the 
thought experiments Parfit employs in Reasons and Persons (Parfit 1987) to examine and 
challenge our deeply held beliefs about the Self and what is important in survival.  The existence 
of the “other” Borges challenges the concept of Self for each of the two.  But unlike Parfit, 
Borges and his other do not turn away from the importance of the concept of identity when faced 
with incongruity; they turn away from the evidence of that incongruity.  After arranging to meet 
again, neither shows up.  The importance of their sense of their own identity is too great, and the 
destruction of that sense might be too devastating to withstand.  
Most people, in what could be called their pre-philosophical state, would likely take 
Borges’ approach.  It does not satisfy Parfit, who seems to delight in creating more and more 
elaborate games to thrust us further and further into a stunned state about what Self might mean. 
He wants us to question whether we should care about it or whether we really care, or ought to 
care, about something else when we talk about survival.  He wants, he says, to give us reason to 
care more about others and to fear suffering and death less.  But there are many problems with 
how he attempts to break down the insistence on the importance of Self.  He wants us to examine 
not just its value as a criterion of survival, but whether it is a concept that has any real 
importance at all. 
Much of the initial force of his argument comes from the effect his imaginative thought 
experiments have on us.  There are whole strains in the literature devoted to some of these 
games, particularly the many variations of the fission or division problem, by which a Self is 




teletransportation of one person into multiple replicas or transplanting the hemispheres of our 
brains into separate bodies.  This problem asks us to consider how we can reconcile the intuitive 
idea of the importance of identity of Self as a one-to-one relationship over time with the 
possibility, however far fetched, that one person could be divided or copied into two or more 
persons who share the same set of memories, beliefs, desires and intentions not only with the 
first person, but with one another.   
In a case such as the one in which my consciousness would somehow be duplicated so 
that there would be two people sharing my memories, beliefs, etc., he argues, all the 
characteristics that seem to constitute identity hold, but without the one-to-one relationship over 
time that is crucial to identity.  If I were told that I would be split into two people in the future, 
somehow intact, how could I respond?  Parfit says there are only three basic possible responses, 
in terms of identity: (1) I am neither of the two future persons, thus “I” do not survive; (2) I 
survive as one of the two but not the other; and (3) I, or all that is important about what I call “I” 
survives as both of them.  Faced with this dilemma, Parfit rejects the first two responses and 
accepts the third as the least implausible. 
His approach is to claim that (1) “Psychological continuity is more important than 
sameness of the body” and (2) “Psychological continuity might not be one-one.”  He assumes 
that because, logically, one person cannot be two persons, there must not really be three persons 
after any of his various thought experiments that result in two people having psychological 
continuity with one person.  Instead, he says, there is only one branching stream of 
consciousness, which survives without preserving personal identity.  If the criterion of personal 




transporter – one, two, or more.  Survival in the Reductionist terms he describes should be just 
about as good as ordinary survival, he says. 
Certainly being told that such a thing would be done to you would likely cause a 
psychological crisis.  However, the experiential nature of the Self means that each of those 
teletransported Selves would immediately begin to differentiate, and the branching streams of 
consciousness would each quickly become unique, just as a river that splits around an island will 
be different on each side.  Further, because Narrativity is not merely a backward looking project, 
but a form finding over time by which we also project into the future, each of those new 
individuals, even if they were starting with the same sets of memories, beliefs, etc., would be 
forced to begin revising their assessment of the significance of their past experiences.  So the 
identity of the two “I”s would be short lived, quickly transformed by each engaging uniquely in 
Narrativity. 
Let me now analyze Parfit’s position on the issue of fission of persons.  First of all, I will 
point out a few inconsistencies in Parfit’s approach.  He says: “When I’m psychologically 
continuous with only one person, we call it identity.  But if I’m psychologically continuous with 
two future people, we can’t call it identity.”  So here we have two components to the process of 
defining who is who: (1) psychological continuity; (2) how many people result from 
fission.  Hence, psychological continuity is not the single criterion of personal 
identification.  And therefore, Parfit’s thesis that there is nothing more to personal identity than 
psychological continuity fails.  
When Parfit says, “survival is what matters,” he means psychological survival.  But how 
would this psychological survival be established?  He says, “What I’m arguing against is this 




however much we change, there’s a profound sense in which the changed us is going to be just 
as much us.”  So something psychological survives – not us precisely – but what?  If this 
survivor in the brain transplant experiment cannot identify itself with the brain donor, can this 
something say, “I survived”?  If it cannot, then can psychological identity exist without personal 
identity?  Is Parfit right when he says it might be possible to think of experiences in a wholly 
impersonal way, that is, without the person? 
One problem for Parfit’s argument is that for there to be “experiences,” there must be 
something to have them.  That is, it is not enough for the sun to shine for there to be an 
experience of the sun shining.  The temperature of a rock may be raised by the sun’s rays, but 
that rock, lacking consciousness, does not have an experience of the warmth of the sun.  Even a 
plant, in which certain processes may be initiated as a result of the sunshine -- growth, buds or 
flowers forming, photosynthesis -- still could not be said to experience the sun, because it lacks 
the necessary condition for having experience -- consciousness.  An experience is be definition 
an event of consciousness.  If there is no consciousness, there is no experience.  Given the 
problematic nature of discussing animal consciousness, I will leap from plants to humans.  Any 
experience, because it is a product of consciousness, is necessarily individual.  Even two people 
standing side by side feeling the same warm sun will have unique, individual experiences of that 
sunshine, not only because of whatever slight physiological differences there may be in their 
bodies, but because of the psychological differences between them, the different associations 
they may have.  So even in an experience as seemingly mundane -- “impersonal,” if you will -- 





So Parfit’s claim raises troubling questions on the intuitive level.  But, as Brian Garrett 
points out in “Personal Identity and Reductionism,” there are also serious questions about the 
leap of logic that Parfit is forced to make to satisfy his claim.  He says that if the Reductionist 
claim that a person is just a brain, a body and a series of interrelated physical and mental events 
is true, “we can describe this fact by claiming either 
(10) that there exists a particular brain and body, and a particular series of interrelated 
physical and mental events. 
or 
     (11) that a particular person exists” (Parfit 1987, 212). 
He asserts that if we know that the first statement is true, we will know that the second is true. 
Garrett denies both that statement (11) entails statement (10), and that knowing the first 
we can know the second, and he uses one of the thought experiments that Parfit also uses in other 
places in his account to attempt to prove both his claims.  In World 1, A’s brain is split and the 
two halves are put into two new bodies exactly similar to A’s, B and C.  In World 2, the same 
operation is begun, but the surgeon drops the brain hemisphere intended for C’, and only B’ 
survives.  In World 1, it cannot be said that either B or C is numerically identical to A, whereas 
in World 2, B’ “is one, sufficiently good, candidate for identity with A. ... If A is B’ in world 2, 
and A is not B in world 1, it follows, by the necessity and transitivity of identity, that B and B’ 
are distinct persons.  Yet B and B’ possess the same brain and body, and are ‘associated’ with 
the same stream of interrelated mental and physical events” (Garrett 1991, 367).  Garrett’s 




Parfit, drawing on a long philosophical tradition that compares persons to entities such as 
clubs or nations that change in various ways over time, but are still called by the same name, 
attempts to undermine the concept of the importance of identity.  He says (Parfit 2000, 447): 
What I mean by that perhaps could be shown if we take an exactly 
comparable case involving not a person but something about which I think 
we’re not inclined to have a false view…  Something like a club.  Suppose 
there’s some club in the nineteenth century…  And after several years of 
meeting it ceases to meet.  The club dies…  And then two members, let’s 
say, emigrated to America, and after about fifteen years they get together 
and they start a club.  It has exactly the same rules, completely new 
membership except for the first two people, and they give it the same 
name.  Now suppose someone came along and said: ‘There’s a real 
mystery here, because the following question is one that must have an 
answer.  But how can we answer it?’  The question is, ‘Have they started 
up the very same club … or is it a completely new club that’s just exactly 
similar?’ 
 
Parfit’s answer to this question is that since there’s no difference at all, the clubs are 
completely identical, and that “if we think there’s no difference at all in the case of the clubs, 
why do we think there’s a difference in the case of personal identity, and how can we defend the 
view that there’s difference?”  But as Garrett has already shown, there is something different 
about persons and clubs.  Is there any real sense in which a person can cease to exist, and then at 
some later point decide to come back into existence? 
The thrust of Parfit’s effort is to deny that “personal identity consists in R holding 
uniquely -- holding between one present person and only one future person” (Parfit 1987, 
263).  If there were more to personal identity than relation R -- namely identity -- then perhaps it 
could be asserted that identity mattered more than relation R.  He attempts to dispose of this 
notion in two paragraphs, by setting up an equation: PI (personal identity) = R + U 
(uniqueness).  But then he asserts, “If I will be R-related to some future person, the presence or 




matters most must be the intrinsic relation” (Parfit 1987, 263).  If this is so, it is only because he 
has already posited that “personal identity consists in the holding of relation R, when it takes a 
non-branching form” (Parfit 1987, 263).  So as long as relation R is unique (non-branching) it 
can be considered a basis for personal identity. 
Naturally, not everyone accepts Parfit’s approach.  John Robinson, in “Personal Identity 
and Survival,” questions the whole enterprise, claiming, “Imaginability does not always lead to 
possibility” (Robinson 1988, 323),  and “I would claim that the fact that the acceptance of the 
possibility of bifurcation leads one into a conceptual quagmire -- committed to one of three 
highly implausible descriptions of the consequences of bifurcation -- is sufficient pretext to rule 
out the supposed possibility as a genuine one” (Robinson, 1988, 323).  Parfit has two responses 
to this sort of attack on his method.  One is to admit that he is playing games with our minds to 
shock us out of the habit of accepting of our unexamined, pre-philosophical attitudes.  That is 
fair, though that suggests that we need not take the result of the shock seriously.  It is as though 
he has made us sit through a horror movie, and on the one hand admits that Freddy Kreuger isn’t 
real, but on the other wants us to go back to our lives acting as though he were. 
Parfit’s other response also turns out to be problematic.  He asserts, repeatedly, that one 
of his thought experiments, his split-brain game, is grounded in fact.   He claims that it has 
happened that people have had their hemispheres split and survived with two consciousnesses, so 
it could become possible for doctors to split the two hemispheres of the brain of one person 
whose body was dying, and put them into the two healthy bodies of two brain-dead 
twins.  Despite Parfit’s assertions, science, according to Daniel Dennett and others, says 




brain stem is intact.  Transplanting a brain hemisphere into an empty skull could not succeed 
without a brain stem. 
I believe this is important because of what science says about why Borges and his “other” 
might be right to seek to hold onto their concept of their own identity, when they are faced with 
the facts of the mutability of the characteristics of that identity.  According to Dennett, what 
happens in patients who have the direct connection between the hemispheres of their brains split 
is not what Parfit claims.  Initially the two function separately and a kind of paralysis 
results.  “For brief periods during carefully devised experimental procedures, a few of these 
patients bifurcate in their response to a predicament, temporarily creating a second center of 
negative gravity.  A few effects of the bifurcation may linger on indefinitely in mutually 
inaccessible memory traces, but aside from these actually quite primitive traces of the 
bifurcation, the life of a second self lasts a few minutes at most” (Dennett 1991, 425).  It seems 
that the one-to-one relationship of identity -- a one-one relationship within brain, body and mind 
-- dismissed by Parfit as being merely an intuitively important notion, is too practically important 
to be allowed to be lost.  What Dennett describes may be assailable by games of the imagination 
that boggle our reason, but when confronted by the physical reality, our brains cannot allow the 
problem to remain, and they resolve it.  In this case, at least, one cannot be permanently split into 
two.  The facts of the matter, not intuition, are what demands identity and a single Self. 
To be fair, Parfit addresses this sort of challenge to his thesis -- though not this particular 
one -- when he acknowledges that there may be some evolutionary cause for the widespread 
insistence on identity as what is important in survival.  However, he asserts, if this is so, it is only 
a cause and not a justification, and he says his games make clear that there is no 




attached to a sense of identity as the most important criterion of what it means to survive, that is 
no reason that we, as rational beings, should do the same.  But if survival is what is important, 
and having a belief in identity is an important tool to survival, as he admits evolution indicates, 
then it is not only rational to want to use that tool, it is biologically justified. 
 
Teletransportation and Self 
Leaving aside the brain-split, we can look at another of his thought experiments -- 
teletransportation, the game with which he opens his long discussion of identity.  In this game, I 
am going to travel to Mars, but instead of taking a space ship, I am to step into a booth here on 
Earth, press a green button, and undergo a process that will record the exact state of each of my 
cells, destroying me as it goes.  Then that information will be sent to Mars by radio waves, and 
there a new body, having all my exact specifications, will be created.  The point of this exercise, 
he says, is to show that physical continuity is not a necessary condition for survival, only 
psychological continuity.  Aside from some doubt about whether the machine will work as it is 
supposed to, he says, I should have no other concerns about the process and whether I will 
survive, because all of my psychological states -- my memories, beliefs, desires and intentions -- 
will be recreated in the new me on Mars. 
This, however, is not so obvious.  Marya Schechtman, in The Constitution of Selves 
(Schechtman 1996), draws a case parallel to Parfit’s example, but one that seems less 
immediately acceptable as a description of survival.  Imagine that while I sleep, she says, a 
madman comes into my home and smothers me, but he has also brainwashed my neighbor to 




considered by me as “as good as ordinary survival” because there is psychological continuity 
between my smothered body and my brainwashed neighbor.  How he would respond to such a 
case is not clear, but there is good reason to assume that he would not allow the less pleasant 
circumstances to affect his assertion of what is important. 
The only good reason for rejecting Schechtman’s replication, if we accept Parfit’s, would 
have to be that with teletransportation, I push the green button, and in the case of the madman I 
have no say in the matter.  Is that difference enough to create psychological discontinuity in one 
case (the madman), and thus reject it as being as good as ordinary survival, and not in the 
other?  If so, that difference must be great, because any other difference between the two cases is 
trivial.  The difference between pushing the green button and being smothered by the madman is 
that in the former case I am creating the narrative, I am narrativizing, imagining a possible 
experience of my re-embodied consciousness, that allows me to project it forward.  Even if I see 
the act of pushing the green button as a kind of suicide, it is an action I am taking myself.  In the 
other, consciousness is taken from me.  I am dead. 
This point turns the question of whether there is identity through a person’s life from 
being one focused back in time, to one that looks forward.  When Parfit and others who ask what 
Schechtman calls the reidentification question, they often look at person-slices, examine them for 
the presence of memories, experiences, desires, beliefs and intentions that can be correlated to 
another person-slice.  This may be the wrong way to find what they are looking for. 
First of all, there is good reason to question the whole venture of the “person-
slice.”  How thick a slice of a person’s life is enough to capture what it means to be that 
person?  The only way a slice can in any real way represent a person is if we believe that life is 




friend what time it is and he looks at his clock, he tells me, “7:23:34, no, it’s 7:23:35; no, 
wait...”  In life, the minute hand moves unnoticeably, and seemingly at different speeds at 
different times.  Any decision to take a “person-slice” must be purely arbitrary, and therefore 
unreliable. 
Parfit tries a different approach when he wants to define how we might determine 
whether he is now and at some other times one and the same person, with his notion of “strong 
connectedness,” but his language here becomes nearly empty.  Having come up with the term 
quasi-memory, to allow for the possibility that a person would not be limited to remembering 
only their own experiences, he sets out to define what would be required to establish links of 
connectedness over time.  “There is strong connectedness of quasi-memory if, over each day, the 
number of direct quasi-memory connections is at least half the number in most actual lives” 
(Parfit 1987, 222). 
Is a “direct quasi-memory connection” as seemingly simple as “I remember a red lamp,” 
or as complex as the memory that Schechtman recounts in her refutation of Parfit’s assertion that 
one person could intelligibly have another person’s memories implanted in them?  How would 
these be counted?  Why delineate the time period as one day?  Why half the number and how 
many might there be in “most actual lives”?  None of this is clear at all, and he makes no attempt 
to clarify. 
Schechtman contends, “So far, the only evidence we have that there is no deep unity 
[identity] throughout the course of a person’s life is the inability of reidentification theorists to 
express one” (Schechtman 1996, 91).  She maintains that because of the strength of our intuition 




evidence as the basis for his argument, and dismisses both the intuition and a possible cause of 
the intuition -- evolution -- as not being justification.  But there may well be justification. 
 
Why Self Matters 
To turn away from thought experiments, let’s look at the cases Dennett describes of 
victims of child abuse who develop what psychologists call Multiple Personality 
Disorder.  These are cases when children who are brutally abused invent new identities for 
themselves, identities of children who are not abused.  What is the justification for this?  If A is a 
child who is abused by B, A may correctly feel that as a result of the abuse her feelings, 
emotions, beliefs and actions are caused by B, not by A herself.  This would result in A not being 
able to expect to be held responsible or be rewarded for anything, because A is not causing any 
actions, feelings, beliefs, memories or emotions that A experiences.  In this condition, A could be 
said not to exist.  In order for A to exist, she must in some way control herself, thus she needs a 
personality -- an identity -- that is not controlled by B through abuse.  Again, if survival is what 
is important, in any form, then at least in this case, it seems that identity, not Relation R, is 
crucial. 
In another case, when my father-in-law had brain surgery, he said when he first woke up 
he found himself a blank slate and his first conscious thought was, “Who am I?”  Now Parfit, 
when he attempts to answer that question, says it is crucial not to presuppose the existence of the 
person in the answer.  He suggests it is wrong to phrase the question in such a way that it 
does.  Yet when the brain is confronted by emptiness, it seems what it does is exactly the 




asked about persons, responded to with answers about identity.  “I” refers to a distinct individual, 
determinate in some way -- a Self.  If Parfit is right about what matters, then the first question 
asked when confronted with a void should have been something different, though it is difficult to 
imagine quite how that question should be phrased.  Again, Parfit might accept there is a cause 
for asking this question in response to the described situation, but is there a justification?  The 
goal of the question is not the goal of the reidentification question.  It is not to determine whether 
I am the same person as I was at some earlier time or will be some time in the future.  The goal is 
to find the way by which I can make sense of my experiences, to decide among competing 
desires and beliefs, and, most importantly to determine reasons for actions so that I can act.  The 
goal of the question is to find the Self. 
It is interesting to note that Parfit himself admits more than once that he himself finds it 
hard to believe what he calls the truth.  “What I find is that I can believe this view at the 
intellectual or reflective level.  I am convinced by the arguments in favor of this view.  But I 
think it is likely that at some other level I shall always have doubts” (Parfit 1987, 279), he 
says.   Again he admits, “But I expect that I would never completely lose my intuitive belief in 
the Non-Reductionist view. ... If tomorrow someone will be in agony it is hard to believe it could 
be an empty question whether this agony will be felt by me” (Parfit 1987, 280).  Then he turns to 
Buddha for support, saying, “Buddha claimed, though this is very hard [i.e., to believe the 
Reductionist view he argues for], it is possible.  I find Buddha’s claim to be true ” (Parfit 1987, 
280).  This, perhaps even Parfit himself would admit, is very strange and not at all 
convincing.  But Parfit, with his prescriptive account of Self, is seeking a way to make us care 
more about others, and the way he wants to achieve this is -- like Buddha -- to make us less 




I will not go more deeply into a response to this than to say that self-awareness also holds 
the potential to make us care about and respect others.  Saying, “My Self matters,” does not 
entail saying, “My Self is the only Self that matters.”  On the contrary, perhaps the most 
powerful tool to care about another person is the ability to imagine ourselves experiencing what 
they are experiencing.  Again, through Narrativity, to transpose another person’s experience onto 
our own possible present or future.   
The power of narratives to elicit emotions is not based in an absence of Self on the part of 
the audience, but on the audience placing themselves within the story -- identifying with one or 
more of the participants in the narrative.  Certainly this is one common argument for the value of 
literature -- that through it we learn to be more understanding of others.  If this is so, it is not 
because we “lose ourselves” in Anna Karenina, as the cliche would have it, but because we are 
able to inhabit Anna Karenina, something we cannot do fully if we are not self-aware.  If we 
accepted Parfit’s argument that we should care less about ourselves, that could as easily lead us 
to care less about others.  Instead of empathizing with Anna’s plight, we could feel she should 
stop being so self-indulgent, just as we have done.  Instead, by feeling, through Narrativity, what 
experiencing Anna’s plight would mean for my Self, I am able to care more deeply about her.  I 
will return later to discuss more fully the relationship between literature, emotion, and 
Narrativity. 
In response to Parfit’s assertion that all that matters in survival is psychological 
connectedness with Relation R, I would propose an alternate thought experiment.  What if a mad 
scientist has taken me prisoner and offers me two choices.  Either I can be struck with complete 
amnesia, but left with a completely functioning body and brain, or I can keep all my memories, 




remains intact, but I will be a brain in a vat.  And I will be aware that I am a brain in a vat and 
nothing more.  Which would I choose?  In this case, give me amnesia.  In this case, when asked 
what is important about survival, it is not connection to the past, not even connection to a 
particular identity.  Certainly I would regret that in a moment, when the mad doctor pulled the 
switch, my memories would be wiped out, but the ability to act would not.   
From this case it might seem I am choosing to give up identity.  In the sense that I am 
giving up the identity that I had through my life until the mad doctor shuts off the stream of 
consciousness that has been my Self, that is true.  But in another sense, that is not quite right.  I 
am choosing the ability to create a Self that can act, because without that, nothing else has any 
value whatsoever.  In the vat I might still be A, but it doesn’t seem that would do me much 
good.  With amnesia, I would no longer be A, could not be compensated or held responsible for 
A’s actions, could no longer carry out A’s intentions, would not have A’s values or beliefs.  As 
B, though, I would develop new intentions, beliefs and desires, accumulate new memories.  I 
would lose the past of my Self, but gain the future, knowing that I continue to have new 
experiences, to Narrativize, and thus build a new Self, which would be just as much me as the 
previous one. 
In this sense, I argue that denying the value of identity, as Parfit does, because it seems to 
fail as a tool for reidentification is misunderstanding the use of identity.  Even an episodic is 
faced with the constant question, “What do I do now?”  Answering that question -- acting in a 
directed way -- requires a Self, and the projection of that Self into a posited future, even if that 
future is as immediate as the ever appearing new Now.  Narrativity allows for and accepts the 
possibility of the Self evolving and changing through time, without giving up the one-to-one 




identity -- between person A at 5 years old and person A at 50, despite the great physical changes 
that have occurred, there is a one-to-one relationship between Selves, even when, as for 
Strawson, the feeling of connection may be weak.  There is a unique identity connection through 
all the series of Selves that Strawson feels himself to have been, and no other non-GS Selves 
share that relationship. 
With persons or Selves -- indeed, with any object in the physical world -- it is a 
fundamental mistake to take the term “identity” as having the same truth makers as it does in 
mathematics, because mathematical terms are atemporal.   Whether it is possible to determine 
whether A is the same person at two different times may be an empty question.  In the world, 
where an answer is needed, criteria are established that make it possible to give an answer in 
practical ways.  For the more complex question we ask ourselves, “Who am I?” -- a question that 
must be asked and answered if we are to begin to make sense of experience -- the uniqueness that 
Parfit wants to discard, identity, is the tool to begin to find an answer.  But to use that tool, we 
employ Narrativity, which as form finding over time, allows us to comprehend the changes we 
have gone through in the past, and to project into the possibilities of the future, forming other 
cognitive tasks that involve coherence seeking and form-finding tendencies, such as making 
sense of our mundane experience, as well necessary epistemologically.  Narrativity is also the 
mental component we engage when we initiate actions, whether on a trivial scale, such as 
making coffee, or for larger projects. To approach the issue from another end, any discussion of 
actions requires an appeal to the narrative nature of our experience, the necessity of which is 
demonstrated in the language that must be used.  This necessity extends to our mental activity 
because the way we are engaged in project making linguistically, our mental activity is engaged 





Narrativity and Emotions in Literature 
I will turn now from the process of Narrativity to the product -- in particular fictional 
narratives, to discuss how stories and novels engage our emotions.  I make this digression 
because it has implications for how Narrativity functions in response to life.  As I will show, 
Narrativity is the mental process by which we make sense of works of fiction, and how it 
functions in relation to these works is the same way it functions in relation to our experiences. 
The relationship of Narrativity to emotion also needs to be explored, because emotions 
play a key role in our conception and creation of Self.  In many ways we define our Self by our 
emotions --our wants and desires, our likes and dislikes, and our hopes and fears.  As such, we 
need to understand what emotions are, how they arise, and what role Narrativity plays in our 
experience of emotions and how we respond to them. To do this, I will look at Jenefer 
Robinson’s account of emotions in literature, because while I agree with her premise, I feel she 
goes astray in where she takes that premise.  I will examine first her account of emotions and 
how she sees that as relevant to a solution to the paradox of fiction.  I will raise questions both 
about her definition of emotions as affective appraisals and whether her definition is applicable 
to the way emotions are aroused regarding literature.  I will then show how our Narrativity is 
engaged by literature, proposing that in that way we can solve the paradox of fiction.  
Robinson, in her book Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and its Role in Literature, Music, 
and Art (Robinson 2005), says that “the emotional process is the same in both the real life and 
the fictional case.”  I am inclined to agree with this, but there appears to be a problem in her 




literature the trigger for our emotional process is not perceptions but cognition (reading the 
words of a novel or story).  I propose to take a close look at her account of how we can have 
genuine emotions regarding fictional characters, and propose a different answer to the problem 
by examining the intrinsic characteristics of literature that trigger our emotions, and how writers 
such as Dostoevsky engage the reader with the characters in his novels.  I will argue that 
understanding literature requires an active response -- it engages our Narrativity, just as 
Narrativity is engaged in response to our experience of our lives. 
To demonstrate how her theory could be applied to literature, Robinson focuses primarily 
on two 19th century novels, Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, which often seems to be the standard 
point of reference in discussions of this topic, and Edith Wharton’s The Reef, to which she gives 
a close reading.  Because Robinson equates our emotional response to fiction with our emotional 
response to film and theater, her decision to limit her discussion to traditional realist novels 
makes sense, since these novels work by an accumulation of sharp, finely observed detail, so the 
reader is able to easily imagine or create a mental image of what is described. 
However, since the turn of the 20th century, realism is an approach that has been 
employed primarily by writers of popular fiction, which appeals to a less sophisticated audience 
than the audience for serious literature. Nevertheless, readers have still been emotionally moved 
by the works of writers who have broken from that tradition.  So the question is how to explain 
that engagement. 
In contrast to Robinson, I have chosen Dostoevsky as the primary example for my 
discussion because if Tolstoy can be considered as the perfection of the 19th century realist 
tradition, Dostoevsky is one of the first writers to break from that tradition.  He, unlike Tolstoy, 




Conrad, Faulkner, Virginia Woolf.  As Joseph Brodsky said, from Dostoevsky we get Kafka, 
from Tolstoy we get Margaret Mitchell. 
Before looking at literature and how it engages our emotions through Narrativity, 
however, we need to look at emotions themselves.  Robinson offers a new theory of emotion, 
and through that theory she says she has found an answer to the paradox of fiction.  She 
characterizes the paradox of fiction by the following three propositions: 
(a) We often have emotions for fictional characters and situations known to be purely 
fictional; 
(b) Emotions for objects logically presuppose beliefs in the existence and features of 
those objects; 
(c)  We do not harbor beliefs in the existence and features of objects known to be 
fictional. 
While she admits that “temporarily we stop paying attention to the fact that characters are 
fictional,” her solution to the paradox is to deny (b) and claim that emotional responses to fiction 
are “always based on a non-cognitive and automatic appraisal from which emotions follow like 
reflexes or startle mechanisms.” However, to “stop paying attention” seems to be a necessary 
condition for having an emotion in response to fiction. 
My problems with her account are twofold.  First, as I have said, our experience of 
literature is cognitive not sensual, so it is hard to see how emotions could arise from a non-
cognitive appraisal, as she says they do.  It also raises the stakes on belief, because our feelings 




that we have of people we meet.  I am sympathetic with her assessment that the suspect 
proposition in the paradox is (b), but will argue that while emotions do not presuppose an 
explicit belief in the existence of the objects of those emotions, they do presuppose an absence of 
active disbelief in the existence of those objects.  The task of novelists who want the reader to 
respond emotionally to their work, then, is to create strong enough belief in the properties of the 
characters and situations they describe that disbelief in existence becomes no longer an 
issue.  Second, while literature can trigger simple, monolithic emotions (“Poor Anna”), it can 
also trigger more complex, fine-grained and sometimes even simultaneous conflicting emotions 
(horror at Raskolnikov the murderer, compassion for Raskolnikov the loving brother and son).  I 
find it hard to see how her affective appraisal theory allows for the ambiguous or mixed response 
to fiction. 
Robinson’s argument omits almost any discussion of precisely how an author works to 
make the reader respond emotionally to the novel.  There is the sense that assuming the author 
wants the reader to feel emotion, she will feel it.  Empirically, this is obviously not true.  The 
question then is why she reads Anna Karenina and is moved to tears and I read it and am left 
cold (even though I might be willing to accept that it is a great work of literature).  Her reply 
seems to be that not feeling emotion is an inappropriate response, and indicates that something 
must be lacking in the reader: Such a reader must have a “low emotional IQ.”  But while I might 
not shed tears over Anna, it might be that when I read Tess of the d’Ubervilles I cry, proving that 
I can respond emotionally to literature, so maybe my IQ is not so low after all.  
Rather than looking at the reader to resolve this dilemma, another place to inquire might 
be the works themselves and the techniques the author uses to create what I will call tacit belief 




belief in the existence of that world, which forces the reader to consider the work through 
Narrativity -- constantly imagining possibilities for where the story will go and re-evaluating 
previous events and judgments of characters.  It is through the engagement of this Narrativity 
that emotions are triggered in response to the content of our thoughts about the novel or 
story.  Thus the emotional engagement a reader feels with the work of literature, and the 
resulting emotions, can be seen as a result of those techniques. 
I will demonstrate with examples from Dostoevsky’s novels how such techniques as 
ambiguity, unreliable narration, polyphony and the dialogical style of writing can lead the reader 
to experience a novel in a way similar how she might experience the world.  Those techniques 
indeed contribute to engaging the reader as an active participant in the events and thinking of 
characters the way we think of real people -- through Narrativity.  My point is not to deny that 
Tolstoy (or Wharton for that matter) inspire emotions, but to move the discussion forward, into 
modern fiction, where the techniques employed are less about realistically -- for lack of a better 
word -- portraying scenes and characters, and more about engaging the reader’s mind, and 
through that very activity surreptitiously creating tacit belief in the fiction. 
I will return to these issues and explain more fully what I mean by tacit belief after a 










Emotion as a process. Affective appraisals 
Robinson’s account of emotion is based on her affective appraisal theory. It assumes that 
emotion is a process that starts with a non-cognitive response or appraisal of the situation, 
followed by a physiological reaction and finally by cognitive monitoring of the situation.  She 
says that emotion is a process that always involves these three aspects. 
Emotions do not require cognitive judgment on her view, and she asserts that cognitive 
evaluations might not be enough to bring about physiological changes and trigger emotions.  It is 
important to notice that on Robinson’s account the initial affective appraisal of the situation is 
non-cognitive and therefore cannot be sensitive to judgmental beliefs.  As she says, “I can be 
afraid without judging that there is a snake before me; I may merely register a curly stick-shape 
on the forest floor” (Robinson 2005, 55). 
Affective appraisals for Robinson happen automatically and unconsciously. “I shall 
assume that they (affective appraisals) are ‘non-cognitive,’ in the sense that they occur without 
any conscious deliberation or awareness, and they do not involve any complex information 
processing” (Robinson 2005, 45).  The affective appraisal alerts a person “picking out from the 
multitude of competing stimuli” (Robinson 2005, 46) to something that is vital to the biological 
function of an individual and needs to be dealt with, i.e. anything vital to the organism’s 
interests, goals, wants and values. 
In other words, an affective appraisal is like a jolt, which doesn’t bear any cognition or 
semantic content. In fact, when she uses OFFENCE! or BAD! or NO! to characterize an 
affective appraisal, Robinson deliberately puts those words in bold, so they are not to be 




immediately result in physiological changes such as physiological arousal or change in facial 
expression, increased heartbeat etc., followed by a cognitive monitoring of the situation.   
This seems to make sense when we talk about simple perceptions such as hearing a loud 
sound triggering our emotional responses. Nevertheless Robinson claims that we can also have 
affective appraisals as a result of complex thoughts and beliefs. 
For example, she says: “When I catalogue my emotion as ‘resentment,’ I am implicitly 
adverting to a situation in which (I think) I have been treated badly and (I think) I don’t deserve 
it, and it well may be that these thoughts play a causal role in the emotion process: indeed my 
affective appraisal of Offence! may be an affective appraisal of the situation as I thought it to be” 
(Robinson 2005, 91). 
  Robinson says that what those theorists who consider emotions as kinds of judgments, 
rather than as triggered by something non-cognitive, failed to show was the linkage between 
cognition and emotion.  By her account, the link is the affective appraisals.  She says, “... what 
turns cognition into emotion is an affective appraisal and its concomitant physiological changes” 
(Robinson 2005, 62).  To demonstrate how cognition turns into emotion she takes the example of 
a realization that one’s stock portfolio is performing badly after having studied long and hard to 
find that out. This is realized only after lengthy cognitive evaluation, but once it is realized an 
affective appraisal occurs.  “I am suddenly frightened or vulnerable” (Robinson 2005, 62).  She 
comments: “We can think of the affective appraisal here as a kind of ‘meta-response,’ evaluating 
in a rough and ready way -- for example, as bad for me or good for me -- an already existing 
cognitive evaluation” (Robinson 2005, 62). 
The acceptance of this point is crucial to accepting her account of how we can feel 




however, a difficulty with making a parallel from this case to having emotion from reading 
fiction.  Robinson says that we can have emotion as a result of the content of our thoughts.  The 
stock portfolio is real, and we know that as we are thinking long and hard about it.  Part of the 
content of our thought about it must be that it is real, and thus the effect of its collapse on us will 
be real, too.  But when we read fiction, the content of our thoughts about the characters and 
situations in the fiction cannot include the fact that they are real, and how can something we do 
not think real be either bad for me or good for me? 
To get around this, Robinson says we “stop paying attention” to the part of the content of 
our thought about Anna that she is not real, just a fictional character.  Though her terminology is 
different, this still sounds like she’s saying we suspend our disbelief.  I will argue, contrary to 
Robinson, that we cannot simply stop paying attention to this voice.  Instead, the writer silences 
the voice that says that what we are reading is not real, and convinces us to have some kind of 
belief in the fiction we are reading. 
The standard argument against us having any belief in fictions is made with regard to 
watching movies or plays.  When we see the Green Slime, we don’t get up and run from the 
theater.  When we see the murderer approaching his victim, we don’t cry out to warn the victim 
or turn on our cell phones and call the police.  These cases do not apply to the reader of fiction, 
because she is not seeing something happening before her eyes.  She is generally reading an 
account of something that supposedly has happened, perhaps long ago or far away from where 
she is sitting, reading.  And yet there are numerous examples of works of fiction that have led 
people to take action in the real world.  Both Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Twain’s 
Puddin’head Wilson had profound effects on Americans’ attitudes about slavery and race 




revolutionaries in Russia, while Dostoevsky’s Demons led to broad support for a government 
crackdown on radicals.  The novels of Dickens are credited with inspiring movements for social 
change in Victorian England.  We need not assume that these responses were naive.  Instead, 
they indicate that these readers had some kind of belief in what they have read, even if that belief 
was only in the possibility that what they read corresponded to the world as it actually 
existed.  The question that remains to be answered is how those beliefs were created. 
 
Emotions in Literature and Resolving the Paradox of Fiction 
Robinson says: “When I am emotionally engaged with a novel, I find my own wants and 
interests to be at stake, I make affective appraisals of what I read, and these affective appraisals 
affect me physiologically, focus my attention, and perhaps lay down emotional memories. 
Finally I cognitively monitor these affective appraisals and the bodily changes they set off” 
(Robinson 2005, 117).  But this account is puzzling when we consider that she also asserts: “It 
doesn’t matter to my emotion systems (fear, anger, sadness, etc.) whether I am responding to the 
real, the merely imagined, the possible or the impossible” (Robinson 2005, 145). 
If we are talking about watching a movie or play and responding emotionally, this might 
be understandable.  Watching a movie, we may know we are in a theater watching something 
projected on a screen, but nevertheless our senses -- at least our sight and hearing -- are being 
bombarded, as they are when we walk down the street.  And because of the darkness of the 
theater, the lack of any other activity around us, our attention is completely focused on the 
screen.  So then the sight of the green slime (to take the standard example) surging suddenly, 




scream of the heroine, even though we might immediately laugh at ourselves. We’ve had an 
affective appraisal (DANGER!), followed by physiological changes (jumping in our seats) and 
then cognitive monitoring (it’s just a movie, silly).  Watching a movie, our senses can fool us 
into responding -- at least momentarily -- to what we don’t believe in. 
The technique of the traditional realist novel is analogous to this, in that it essentially is 
about giving detailed, vivid descriptions of the physical world, but even at that, I would argue, 
the very fact that our senses are not involved in how we respond to Anna, requires that the 
triggering of emotions must work differently for literature.  We cannot experience emotions in 
reading literature unless our mind is in some way believing what we read. 
When it comes to our response to fiction, the analogy Robinson attempts to make with a 
snake in the bushes is false.  In the case she describes, while it may be true that we do not make a 
judgment that there is actually a snake, or perhaps any other specific thing, our senses tell us 
there is something there and it seems to be moving.  We are hardwired to respond to our senses 
when they tell us there is something potentially threatening there, even if an instant later our 
cognition tells us, “It’s just a stick.”  To respond emotionally to thought, however, it seems we 
need to have some kind of belief in the contents of that thought.  This may not be a propositional 
belief; I will call it tacit belief. 
I will define this tacit belief with regards to literature as a belief in the properties of the 
character and their plight that is created by an author, who convinces the reader to hold that 
belief, without that belief entailing either the existence or nonexistence of the character.  When 
we read a work of fiction, we come to hold a set of beliefs about the properties attributed to the 
characters in that work.  These beliefs, like the beliefs we hold about the people we know in our 




propensity to act in various ways, their likes and dislikes.  When the set of beliefs we hold about 
a character in a work of fiction reaches a certain level of complexity and intensity, we hold what 
I will call tacit belief in that character, as if she were a real character.  This tacit belief with 
regard to literature in every way resembles the kind of beliefs we have about those around us in 
the world, because it means we are thinking about the characters in fiction the way we think 
about “real” people.  This tacit belief mobilizes our default assumptions. 
To return to (b) in the paradox of fiction, I would like to consider the difference between 
what may be logically true and the nature of experience.  We hold a potentially limitless set of 
beliefs about any given person, but the importance and our awareness of those beliefs will vary 
greatly.  If I am asked whether I believe Mary has five fingers on each hand, I may say yes, but 
that is a belief that will likely play no role in whether I feel sad if I hear something bad has 
happened to her.  Certain beliefs we hold in the forefront of our minds when thinking about 
people and things, but it is unlikely that existence or nonexistence is one of those, unless -- like 
whether Mary has five fingers on each hand -- it is somehow raised.  This distinction raises the 
problem of (b) in the paradox of fiction, because knowing that we are reading a novel, we know 
the characters do not exist.  However, it also provides the path to the resolution, because when an 
author engages our Narrativity, and thus compels us to mobilize our default assumptions, the 
question of existence or nonexistence is pushed offstage. 
This mobilization of default assumptions is not a conscious or rational act.  We do not 
decide to “make believe” that Raskolnikov exists, we are compelled by the work of the author, 
by the details.  Of course if we are challenged about that assumption, we will deny we believe he 
does exist.  But in our thinking about him, and in our emotional response to him, these default 




We do not will this tacit belief in the character:  With regard to fiction, it is something we 
are convinced into holding if and only if the writer is successful in the literary techniques he 
uses.  This level of belief is something that goes beyond what is experienced in genre fiction.  I 
may be entirely engrossed in a thriller while I am reading it, and may “see” the characters and 
scenes, but will not have the same kind of complex emotional response.  This is because of the 
recognized patterns and norms of genre fiction, which the audience expects. 
There is another potential obstacle that can prevent the formation of this tacit belief in the 
character, which is the relationship between the reader and the author.  I have already said it is 
possible for a reader to not become emotionally engaged with a novel that is generally accepted 
as a great work of literature, even though that read may not have a “low emotional IQ.”  Ted 
Cohen, in Thinking of Others: On the Talent for Metaphor (Cohen 2009), provides one example 
of why this might happen when he discusses his response to Wharton’s House of 
Mirth.  Wharton’s repeated use of certain stereotypes when referring to a character who is Jewish 
jar Cohen, who is also Jewish and admittedly sensitive to such stereotyping, out of his 
involvement in the story.  I describe this phenomenon as the relationship between reader and 
author because it is about how the two get along.  It involves not just a meeting of the attitudes of 
the author and the reader, but language as well.  We see that not only in readers who have 
difficulty with, for example, the complexity of Shakespeare’s language, but also in responses to 
writers of other eras whose language may be simply more formal than contemporary usage.  
It is true that not all writers seek to create an emotional response to the characters in their 
fiction, and the greatest tool to achieve this lack of emotional response is to disrupt the creation 
of tacit belief, by drawing attention away from the characters and on to the text itself, to remind 




Barthelme and many post-modernists.  This is one kind of challenge.  Another can be simply bad 
writing.  Both of these, because they disrupt the emotional process before it is achieved, are 
more effective at changing the way we respond to a character in fiction than when someone, after 
we close the book, reminds us it is only a novel.  By that time, we have already had an emotional 
experience, which by its very nature is nonrational.  So whether it was irrational hardly 
matters.  At that point, the question of existence is only being raised after we already have come 
to hold tacit belief in the character and fictional world and had an emotional response.  So, us 
having genuine emotion while reading the work of fiction is what matters. 
Robinson argues that we do not need to believe in the truth of a thought to have an 
emotional response, and to prove her claim, she offers the example of how thinking that her 
husband (who is safe upstairs) has been killed in a plane crash can make her sad.  I wonder 
whether thinking that her husband had been kidnapped by little green men from outer space 
would make her equally sad?  If not, I would argue that the difference in the two cases is that she 
can believe in the possibility of the hypothetical plane crash, while she cannot believe in the 
possibility of the little green men, even though she might be able to clearly imagine them.  The 
parallel to fiction, I would argue, is simply this: About some works of literature I will have an 
emotional response, because for whatever reason -- it could be the quality of the writing or the 
similarity of some character or event to one I have known or lived through -- I will come to hold 
tacit belief in the characters and situations described.  Others will leave me cold: Perhaps the 
writer is untalented or the events and people described are too far from my own life experience, 
or just “unrealistic.”  For whatever reason, I cannot believe in it on any level, and therefore do 




While some readers may require that if they are going to respond emotionally to a novel, 
its characters, setting and action must be close to the world they know and live in, many others 
do not, and in fact actively seek out writers who can take them into a world far removed from 
their own.  It is a commonplace that one of the values of fiction is that it helps us to experience 
and understand the lives of people very different from ourselves.  The question, then, is how can 
an author make the reader come to hold tacit belief in his fiction, so that then emotions can be 
triggered? 
Traditional realists like Tolstoy make a movie on paper, considering that most readers 
have representations while they read, by describing the surface of reality, so the reader can watch 
the reality unfold.  When the writer is skillful, the reader doesn’t doubt the narrator’s knowledge 
of that reality.  In this sense, the traditional realist novel is opaque. The world of Anna Karenina 
(the character) just is the text of Anna Karenina (the novel). With the masters of realism, such as 
Tolstoy or George Eliot or Dickens, the image created is detailed and sharp, and the reader is on 
solid ground.  As Robinson says, “It is the vivid representations I form, on the basis of Tolstoy’s 
words, that prompt my emotional responses to Anna” (italics mine) (Robinson 2005, 150).  Her 
choice here of the word vivid -- lifelike -- is interesting.  If it is lifelike, it would seem to be at 
least believable. 
The narrator in the traditional realist novel is as a rule omniscient and impersonal, even 
though the narrator will generally color the portrayal of characters in such a way that the reader’s 
response to them is guided in one direction or another.  Strangely enough, Robinson attempts to 
deny this when she argues against Noel Carroll’s notion of “prefocusing,” which she says 
“assumes that the writer can succeed in a relatively straightforward way in fixing the reader’s 




in such a way that a particular emotional response is more-or-less assured” (Robinson 2005, 
183). Yet this is exactly what a writer does whenever she chooses what to describe and how to 
describe it.  Of course, as she says, “when we read a novel, we are always ‘filling in the gaps’ in 
the text,” (Robinson 2005, 184) but we do that based on what we have already learned about the 
characters and events previously described.  This “filling in the gaps” is precisely what we are 
doing constantly with Narrativity.  We posit causal connections between events or actions, we 
ascribe possible motivations to the actions of others, and we project into the future, attempting to 
find form over time.  In our lives, this process requires continual re-evaluation in response to 
new events, new perceptions and changes we feel within ourselves.  When we are talking about 
writers like Wharton or Tolstoy, whose novels contain clear, sharply drawn moral subtexts, 
however, this “filling in the gaps” is indeed relatively straightforward.  And as a result, when the 
reader feels, “Poor Anna,” she can feel confident in her emotion. 
But authors’ approaches to fiction have changed since Tolstoy and Wharton.  Writers 
following in the footsteps of Dostoevsky, who break from the realist tradition, exploit the fact 
that our understanding of fiction is not primarily sensual but cognitive.  Critics who have 
attacked Dostoevsky for failing to use the kind of detailed “stage directions” seen in the realist 
masters of the 19th century miss the point.  He is not interested in creating belief through 
physically detailed description.  Instead, he creates belief primarily through narrative techniques 
that force the reader into a different kind of mental state than a realist novel does.  The reader 
comes to believe without any effort, and maybe even by force of habit, because the narration 
itself is just the foreground, the way it is when a friend tells us a story about people we both 
know.  I will focus on Brothers Karamazov, but similar techniques can be seen to a greater or 




From the very start of the book, we are constantly aware of the narrator.  He intrudes 
with asides; admits his lack of knowledge about certain aspects of the characters; and recounts 
rumors and stories he’s heard that he cannot vouch for but includes anyway.  Adding to the 
confusion is that the voice of the narrator is very much like the voice of the brief introduction, 
which is titled “From the Author,” in which the “author” (Dostoevsky, perhaps) says that the 
reader might be surprised that he chose Alyosha as the hero for this book, and goes on to say that 
really this book, which tells of something that happened 30 years ago, is only a prelude to 
another one about Alyosha “in the present day.”  In this discussion he talks about Alyosha as a 
person who exists outside of the realm/confines of the novel, so the reader is forced to think 
about him as a person, not as a character. 
Further, once having finished the novel, it is likely that the reader might question whether 
the author really did make Alyosha the hero.  It is true that Alyosha is more often the focus of 
the narrator, but Dmitry is the catalyst for almost everything that happens, and he is the one who 
is most profoundly transformed at the end.  The point is, even in retrospect, we are once again 
led to doubt what the narrator says. 
It is not at all clear who the narrator is, other than that he lives in the town where all this 
happened, and seems to have had some limited contact with the participants in the story.  But 
throughout the novel the reader is constantly reminded that someone is telling the story, as the 
narrator comments on his own reaction to things, admits to the uncertainty of certain facts or 
explains why he has given certain details.  These intrusions and asides create doubt about the 
narration itself.  There is an ‘as if’ quality -- as if the narrator is guessing about the characters 
and events that are outside and somehow independent of the narration she is reading, and about 




guessing about the characters and events, she is immediately put in the position of questioning 
and even doubting the narrator.  Once she begins questioning or doubting the narrator, she does 
so as if there is a reality that the narration is about, and as if there is a truth about that reality that 
can be learned. 
In this sense, the late novels of Dostoevsky in particular are translucent -- the reader must 
see through the narration to the seemingly separate, independent reality that the narration is 
about.  The narration clouds the reader’s vision of that “reality,” even as, paradoxically, it is the 
only window the reader has on it.  Perhaps the most extreme example of this technique in 
Dostoevsky is The Adolescent, a novel in which the young narrator understands virtually nothing 
of what is really going on around him.  To have any understanding of the novel, the reader must 
come up with her own account of the characters and events that Dostoevsky’s narrator 
describes.  The reader does not doubt the narrator of Brothers Karamazov to the same extent, but 
she must constantly evaluate what he says, and he himself repeatedly tells us that the story he is 
relating is beyond him. 
Examples can be found on nearly every page of Brothers Karamazov, but I will provide 
just a few to illustrate what I mean: 
 “And here -- a young man moves into the house of such father, lives with him a month 
and then another and both of them go along better than needed. The latter surprised not just me, 
but also a lot of others” (Dostoevsky 1976b, 16). 
Here we see the narrator surprised by something within his own narrative, which would 
seem to require that what he is relating happened separate from him, and outside of his control, 
just as things happen in the world.  The addition that others were also surprised tells us that the 




we are not getting, because we are listening only to him.  Again, this possibility of other versions 
of events, other perspectives and judgments takes us to the way we experience our lives. 
 “The old man spoke more abruptly than it was stated here and than was written down by 
Alyosha. Sometimes he stopped speaking completely, as though he was gathering all his 
strength, gasped for breath, but was as if in excitement. They listened to him touched, though 
most marveled at his words, seeing ignorance in them” (Dostoevsky 1976b, 149). 
The narrator tells us that what he is saying is not an accurate account of the events, and 
we see that what we’re reading about is at two removes from us -- the narrator’s account comes 
from Alyosha’s account, which is also not accurate.  Then, in the “as though” and “as if,” we see 
he does not know the old man’s state: He can only describe what he observed.  But when we 
think about that, we must wonder how the narrator knows that it did not occur as it is written, or 
how the old man spoke, since he was not there.  Instead of creating certainty, the narration 
creates doubt, questions, demanding engagement and requiring that the reader form her own 
judgment. 
 “I wouldn’t expatiate on such trivial and episodic details though, if this meeting of a 
young official with a not-at-all-old widow, which I just now described hadn’t served later on as 
the basis of the life-long career of this exacting and accurate young man and about which 
everyone in our city recollects with amazement up to the present day and about which even we 
will say a special word when we complete our long story about the brothers Karamazov” 
(Dostoevsky 1976b, 406). 
This “we” in Russian is not comparable to the “royal we,” and elsewhere the narrator 
refers to himself as I.  Here he seems to ambiguously include the reader as a participant in the 




important to our understanding of what happened to Dmitry and is key to his fate, the narrator 
dismisses it, and shifts his attention to something outside the main thrust of his story, something 
which despite his promise we never actually get.  We are told that these two minor characters 
have a life that goes on outside his narration, just as we know that all the people we pass every 
day have lives about which we know nothing. 
The importance of the ambiguity or unreliability illustrated in these examples is that 
when we doubt the narrator’s knowledge, we are making an assumption that there is something 
that can be known more fully.  That is, we are separating the text we are reading from what the 
text is about.  This puts us in a mental state similar to what we might experience reading a letter 
or listening to a friend tell a story about herself and other people we might or might not know, 
perhaps, like what we experience reading a biography, a book of history, or a newspaper or 
magazine article.  There is a narration, but there is a separate, independent subject of that 
narration, and we begin to think about them as separate. 
When this technique of narrative uncertainty is applied to the characters, it creates the 
impression that they are not controlled by the author.  The narrator doesn’t know everything 
about them because they are people who have secrets.  The reader is forced to look beyond the 
novel and think about them as though they are independent, as though they can decide what they 
will do, as though they are writing their own story.  Thus the reader is engaged as if by real 
people, who are not controlled by the novelist.  Dostoevsky’s approach is to convince the reader 
that the characters aren’t completely knowable, in just the same way that the people around us in 
real life are not completely knowable. 
The same notion could be applied to the events.  To look outside of Brothers Karamazov, 




Stavrogin (Nikolai Vsevolodovich).  Although I quoted it above, I will quote it again, at greater 
length, because it illustrates so many aspects of the techniques I have been discussing 
(Dostoevsky 1976a, 260-1): 
And, however, then, some people say, another absolutely enigmatic event 
occurred, and, I admit, mostly because of that I mentioned this trip in such detail. 
They say, that when everybody rudely rushed out, Liza, supported by Mavrikiy 
Nikolayevich, suddenly ran into Nikolai Vsevolodovich, in the doorway, in the crowd. ... 
I saw how they ran into each other in the doorway: It seemed to me that they both 
stopped for an instant and somehow strangely looked at one another.  But I couldn’t see 
very well in the crowd.  Some people swore, on the contrary, and absolutely seriously, 
that Liza, looking at Nikolai Vsevolodovich, quickly lifted her hand, just level with his 
face, and probably would have hit him if he hadn’t been able to move away.  Maybe she 
didn’t like the expression on his face or some kind of smile of his, especially then, after 
such an episode with Mavrikiy Nikolayevich.  I admit, I myself didn’t see anything, but 
on the other hand, everybody swore that they saw it, although they couldn’t have because 
of the bustle... Only I didn’t believe it then.  I remember, however, that the whole way 
back Nikolai Vsevolodovich was a little pale. 
 
The narrator tells us his whole point in relating the long scene that precedes this incident 
is to tell us about this moment, but he can’t even say what really happened.  When it comes to 
the effect whatever did happen might have had on the two participants, he can only hypothesize 
about one, Liza, and only describe the appearance of the other, Stavrogin.  They are left to 
themselves. 
The effect of all this on the reader is twofold: 
First, cognitively, we are encouraged to infer and draw conclusions about “what is really 
going on” in the fiction.   Once we start thinking that way, our mind is put into the kinds of 
patterns it follows in thinking about reality, mobilizing our default assumptions and the 
reasoning that flows from them, and engaging our Narrativity, to consider possibilities, to 
attempt to draw causal connections, to posit our own narrative of what is happening to the 
characters.  By forcing the reader into these patterns of thought, Dostoevsky induces a tacit 




Of course, if asked, I will say I don’t believe Liza and Stavrogin exist.  But nevertheless, 
while reading Demons, I think about them as if they did, and am not troubled by a question of 
existence because so many other questions are more pressing.  Moreover I will make a stronger 
claim that the question of existence misses the point, since in the state of tacit belief the form of 
literary discourse becomes irrelevant, whether it is a novel, a letter, a newspaper article or 
somebody's story.  This is what Cohen is arguing when he says that “readers for the Bible fall 
into three groups: those who read the text as an historical account that is generally factual, those 
who read the book as fiction, and those who are agnostic about the veracity of the Bible’s 
descriptions.  My claim is that their feelings for Sisera’s mother are the same, however they 
regard the text” (Cohen 2009, 43). 
But, second, emotionally, we are less confident about what we should feel, because we 
are not confident that what we are being told is true.  This mirrors our response to events in our 
lives, where there is no one -- like an omniscient narrator -- to tell us what to think about those 
events.  This brings me to my second concern with Robinson’s account. 
This scene, like so much in Dostoevsky, leaves us like a man at sea.  The relationship of 
Liza and Stavrogin is one of the main threads of the novel, and yet this instant is emblematic of 
how we have to come to terms with what goes on between them.  Without direct, concrete 
descriptions of their interaction, and without a narrator we can rely on to tell us, or at least 
indicate to us how we should feel about either one of them or their relationship, we are carried on 
waves of uncertainty.  The current is strong, but we do not know where it is carrying us, and it is 
often too strong to resist.  We cannot see the shore; all we see around us are rising and falling 




This is what I call emotional dissonance -- a state in which we experience two or more 
conflicting, perhaps contradictory emotions at once.  As a result of this emotional dissonance, 
just as with dissonance in music, we feel anxiety and a yearning for resolution, which might 
bring about a sophisticated and potentially even more powerful emotional response than we 
would have in situations when we have simple, clear emotions, since the force and resistance of 
conflicting emotions can result in those emotions becoming more intense. 
One of the key elements in a character that will motivate tacit belief is when we see or 
feel that the character experiences emotional dissonance -- the simultaneous experience of two or 
more conflicting or contradictory emotions.  This is because in our lives, the emotions we feel 
almost always contain this dissonance, and if a character in fiction is to “come to life,” she too 
must experience this.  Thus, readers of Anna Karenina are moved by Anna, who is torn by her 
love for Vronsky and the knowledge that pursuing that love will mean that she must leave her 
son, whom she also loves, and give up all her security.  Although another character, Levin, is 
given just as much weight in the novel as Anna, and is in fact Tolstoy’s model of how we should 
live, and even though the novel ends with Levin, not Anna’s suicide, the vast majority of readers 
seem to pay him no mind.  This, I would argue, is because Tolstoy does not present Levin as a 
man in emotional turmoil.  It is not just in serious fiction that this is true.  The favorite formula 
of romance novels is the good girl who falls in love with the bad boy, knowing he is somehow 
bad for her, but wanting to be with him anyway. 
In perhaps the most obvious example, oddly enough from the formally most traditional of 
Dostoevsky’s four “great” novels, Crime and Punishment, readers are drawn to Raskolnikov 




from how he pauses on the street “as if in indecision” and from his conflicting feelings about 
how to pass by the door to his landlady’s apartment.   
In the case of Raskolnikov, he is an axe murderer and rationally speaking we should feel 
repulsion towards him, especially since the narrator does not excuse him or offer any mitigating 
circumstances for why he carried out this brutal act.  While we are shocked and horrified by 
Raskolnikov’s murders of the two women, we cannot help feeling sympathetic to him as well.  In 
part this is because, as I mentioned above, we also see Raskolnikov’s deep love for his mother 
and sister, we see his generosity, his intelligence and his compassion.  But where Dostoevsky 
breaks with traditional realism, and what creates emotional dissonance, is that he takes us so 
deeply into Raskolnikov’s mind and emotions.  As Mikhail Bakhtin says, Dostoevsky “doesn’t 
build the hero from the words of others and from neutral definitions, he neither builds a 
character, a type nor a temperament, nor does he build an objective image of the hero, but 
precisely the word of the hero about himself and his world” (Bakhtin 1963, 62).  This is what 
Dostoevsky calls “realism of a higher kind.”  We see from within Raskolnikov’s mind that he 
too feels revulsion, even when he is contemplating what he is planning to do -- even as he cannot 
name it, but at the same time feels himself somehow compelled towards it.  We see that like any 
decent human being he is horrified by the thought of murdering the old money lender, while he 
attempts to argue himself into it with his proto-Nietzschean ideas, and all the while seeing 
chance or fate somehow directing and aiding his actions.  It is the intensity of this emotional 
dissonance that makes Raskolnikov one of the most compelling characters in literature.  
I would argue that some amount of emotional dissonance is a characteristic of any 
successful work of fiction, but Dostoevsky and the writers of the last hundred years whom he 




calming resolution than traditional realists.  The parallel to music is apparent here.  Without 
some preceding dissonance, the final tonic chord will not provide a satisfying resolution.  But 
many composers of the 20th century have introduced more and more dissonance into music, so 
much, in fact, that the listener might lose any sense of what key the piece is in and how harmony 
can be regained.  To some listeners, of course, these compositions are just “noise.” 
Reading Anna Karenina, it is likely we might feel a conflict between our affection for 
Anna and our disapproval of her cheating on her husband, even if he isn’t as dashing as 
Vronsky.  These emotions clash within us, but all the while there is a feeling of order and 
inevitability about it.  As much as these emotions conflict, we would not think of trying to argue 
Anna out of her affair or trying to comfort her after her husband has thrown her out and cut her 
off from her son.  We can feel that a resolution is coming, and though it is in a decidedly minor 
key, it is a resolution. 
Given Robinson’s focus on traditional realists, this might explain her emphasis on the 
value of literature as providing us with a coping mechanism for dealing with our own strong 
emotions.  Our sadness at Anna’s death is mitigated by the sense of order about it, which is in 
some way comforting, reassuring.  To look at another of Dostoevsky’s novels, by contrast, in 
Idiot, when at the end Rogozhin has stabbed Nastasya Filippovna to death in his bed and 
Myshkin has sunk back into idiocy, there is no comparable sense of order, no comfort.  There is 
no clue of how we are to cope with this horror.  We are in a fog of uncertainty; we are at sea. 
To return to the paradox of fiction, Cohen denies proposition (c) that We do not harbor 
beliefs in the existence and features of objects known to be fictional. He claims that we 
do.  Robinson seems to avoid the paradox by claiming that we temporarily stop paying attention 




fiction are based on non-cognitive and automatic appraisals.  Perhaps the paradox of fiction 
remains unanswered in both cases.  
I would revise proposition (b) to “Emotions for objects logically presuppose beliefs in 
properties and possibility of existence of those objects.”  The belief in the possibility of existence 
that is brought about by belief in features of characters and situations is sufficient for us to have 
genuine emotions since it activates our Narrativizing.  If the reader’s experience of tacit belief 
activated by an author’s techniques on the one hand and the reader’s attunement on the other, 
one’s imagination entertains an “as if” scenario proposed in the description like in real life 
through Narrativity.  So, one is searching for the form to the content proposed and activates 
default assumptions just the way it is done in life.  Regardless of whether the text being read is 
fiction or nonfiction, one is engaged in Narrativizing and thus has a potential for powerful and 
sophisticated emotions for fictional and nonfictional characters and situations. In some cases our 
emotional response could be even more powerful for imaginative “as if” descriptions of 
characters and situations than in reference to the real life people or situations. 
When we are thinking about fiction, the relevant question to ask is not whether the 
characters exist, but whether we believe in them.  Therefore, in the paradox of fiction, 
proposition (b) could be revised as follows: Emotions for objects logically presuppose beliefs in 
the features of those objects (where ‘beliefs in’ should not be read as shorthand for ‘beliefs in the 
existence of’).  I agree with Robinson that we can have an emotional response to the content of 
our thoughts, even when we know that the thought is not true (i.e., her thought that her husband 
has died in a plane crash when he is in fact sleeping safely upstairs), but argue that this is only 
true when we can believe in the possibility of the thought.  When we cannot (i.e., little green 




Punishment, we need not believe that Raskolnikov exists, but we must have tacit belief in 
Raskolnikov.  Tacit belief is a necessary condition for an emotional response to the content of a 
thought, though more examination will be required to determine whether it is also a sufficient 
condition. 
Perhaps because she does not seem to require anything beyond a simple thought for 
emotions to be triggered, Robinson seems uninterested in what role the literary techniques 
employed by an author or even the quality of writing might play in contributing to our emotional 
response.  But I find it hard to see how the question of why a reader has an emotional response to 
some works of fiction and not to others can be answered without looking at these 
issues.  Perhaps a person who never responds emotionally to fiction could be said to have a “low 
emotional IQ,” but that charge is harder to make against a person who, like most people, 
experiences more emotions from some books, less from others, and perhaps none at all from still 
others.   
In my attempt to resolve this, I looked at the techniques employed by Dostoevsky, in 
particular his use of ambiguous, unreliable and intrusive narration, and how those techniques 
force the reader to essentially create her own version of “what really happened.”  Rather than 
relying on vivid -- lifelike -- descriptions to create belief in something observed, as in the 
traditional realism discussed by Robinson, Dostoevsky induces the reader to think about the 
characters and events the narrator describes in the same way she thinks about the people and 
events in the world around her.  Unlike the techniques associated with traditional realism, which 
attempt to convince us to believe in the characters through vivid, detailed descriptions, this 
technique surreptitiously makes the reader believe in (without needing to believe in the existence 




The reader’s emotional response to this kind of technique is often emotional dissonance, 
the experience of simultaneous conflicting or contradictory emotions.  One reason that emotional 
dissonance is so powerful when we feel it as a result of reading fiction is that we so often feel it 
in our own lives.  Indeed, it is more common than what Kivy (Kivy 2006) calls “the garden 
variety of emotions,” which seem to be what Robinson too often refers to in her affective 
appraisals.  We feel sympathy for someone while at the same time feeling disapproval or even 
revulsion for what they have done.  We like someone, though we feel our friendship for them is 
bad for me.  We enjoy putting ourselves in situations where we are afraid.  Most powerfully 
perhaps is love, which is often a state for which we can give no good reasons.  It can happen that 
our love flares up strongest at moments when we most strongly feel some weakness or flaw in 
the character of the person we love.  Our lives do not resemble traditional realist novels, with 
their sense of moral and formal order much as we might like them to. 
In thinking about our own lives, we are faced with much the same problem we face when 
reading a novel by Dostoevsky.  The characters -- the people around us -- are independent 
beings.  They have secrets, they have thoughts and emotions that are not known to us with 
certainty.  We are faced with ambiguity and possibility, and must actively reconstruct as we do 
reading Dostoevsky.  As I have said, in fact the metaphor goes the other way.  Reading 
Dostoevsky, we do what we have to do in our own lives.   
This does not only apply to the past, however.  As we go through our lives, projecting 
into the future as we decide on plans and how we will act, we must actively construct the future, 
considering possibilities and dealing with ambiguity.   
Indeed, even in the present moment, in response to those who claim to live only in the 




the past or the future.  The use of Narrativity in response to the scene of the possible slap in 
Dostoevsky’s Demons is completely analogous to what we face at any moment.  We have to 
wonder, how much of what is happening do we really see?  What do we know of the people 
around us that would make them act the way they do?  What does what they are doing tell us 
about them?  What does what we think we know about them tell us about their actions? 
Even in the present we must employ Narrativity to actively reconstruct the current 
moment, or we cannot possibly understand it.  This might seem to take the temporal element out 
of Narrativity, but that is not the case.  Rather, in thinking about the character of those around us, 
we must think of their stories, because character only exists through time.  Even for someone we 
have just met, to start to understand them we have to project back, to essentially create a possible 
story -- to actively construct who we believe they are.  This is because character, whether in 
















Focusing on the descriptive narrative thesis as introduced by Galen Strawson in his essay 
“Against Narrativity,” I made my claim “For Narrativity” as a mental process of form finding 
and coherence seeking over time that is an inherent mental activity and essential for experience 
of one’s Self.  I showed that considering Narrativity as viewing life as a narrative or a story -- 
focused on the product, rather than the process of Narrativizing -- is a category mistake, since the 
variable of time is taken out of the equation of our experience. As a consequence, I put forward a 
revised definition of Narrativity, as a process of Narrrativizing, i.e., taking the temporal flow of 
experience and continually shaping and reshaping it, working towards something like a narrative, 
without ever necessarily achieving a completed form. This revision takes into account that we 
are temporal beings who have a natural tendency to gather and hold a manifold of our 
experiential content over time as it is in the process of change and transformation as our Selves.  
The nature of this Form-finding in Narrativity, like the Kantian notion of apperception, is 
the power of our mind to hold a unity of any experiential content over time, whether it could be 
narrated in language as a literary work or could be held in our mental reality as a Humean bundle 
of perceptions.  As Danto, Richer and Husserl have variously shown, because of the nature of 
language, just by using words we place ourselves in a temporal context.  The use of verbs place 
us in actions that occur over time, and many verbs require a projection of ourselves into the 
future.  Thus, even in discussing or thinking about simple, everyday activities we are proposing a 
possible narrative -- narrativizing.  This level of Narrativity as process, which could be present in 
actions such as making coffee, Strawson accepts and ackowledges that he does engage in.  But 




descriptive thesis of Narrativity.  I have shown, however, that since they could constitute the first 
steps of larger projects and have non-trivial implications, Strawson's triviality claim falls into a 
slippery slope argument.  
As I have argued that the Self is created through Narrativity, I have looked at challenges 
to whether the Self should be valued as an organizing principle of experience.  Parfit raises the 
question of whether it is possible to think of experiences in an impersonal way. Such a view is 
problematic, since if there could be no experience if there is no consciousness to have them. 
Parfit uses various thought experiments in his attempt to make us give up our consideration of 
the Self as valuable and to suggest psychological continuity as a necessary condition for survival, 
but I countered with evidence from neuroscience and thought experiments of my own showing 
that Parfit's arguments do not hold. I claim that Narrativity is instead such a condition and it 
assumes a subject of experience-Self and is essential for creation of Self. 
Returning to Strawson's objection that he feels himself to be "Episodic," existing in the 
"Now," and thus non-Narrative, I responded to several of his arguments to show that even this 
way of being, one’s existence is still experienced in time. As William James points out, the 
“Now” could be experienced as specious present or a “saddle back,” with an indeterminate 
duration that is constantly moving into the future and receding into the past.  
Strawson invokes Proust and Musil, among other literary figures, as evidence of what it 
means to be an Episodic, so I examined both of them to see whether their so-called episodicity 
negated any Narrativity. In Proust, for example, involuntary memory for takes us into the 
experience of the past in the present moment, which he says makes him an “extra-temporal 
being.”  However that being is hardly a candidate for a non-Narrative person, since such an 




Narrativize and relive our past Self.  Musil’s "Man Without Qualities," as I have shown, could 
not be qualified as non-Narrative, even if it were accepted that he is an Episodic character, 
because he lives in his world of possibilities, constantly Narrativizing and projecting into the 
future. 
Going beyond the realm of experience, I also showed the role that Narrativity plays in our 
appreciation of literature, particularly in regard to the so-called Paradox of Fiction, or how it is 
that we are able to experience real emotions about characters and situations we know are not 
real.  I showed that the garden variety of emotions is not sufficient to explain our cognitive 
response to literature and the affective appraisal theory argued by Jennifer Robinson leaves aside 
complicated cognitive responses, such as what I call emotional dissonance that is triggered by 
such writer's techniques as ambiguity, unreliable narration, polyphony and dialogic style of 
writing.  To resolve the paradox of fiction, I think that emotion is the same in real life and in 
fiction as Robinson says, but the emotional trigger in reading literature is not perception, but 
cognition.  Also, as Cohen proposes, emotions do not presuppose an explicit belief in the 
existence of objects known to be fictional. I think that the task of a writer is to create what I call 
a tacit belief in the properties of fictional characters and situations. The reader must have that 
tacit belief to respond emotionally to a content of a thought. That could be achieved when an 
author engages our Narrativity and thus compels us to mobilize our default assumptions about 
the possibility of a hypothetical situation, so the question of existence and not existence is 
offstage.  
Faced with the ceaseless flow of experience over time, we have no choice but to attempt 
to make sense of it, to somehow create an order.  This form-finding over time is Narrativizing, 
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